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As of 2016, 12 percent of the world’s population lives in 36 megacities. By 2030, 
experts estimate that 17 mega regions, hosting 60 percent of the world’s population, will 
account for 75 percent of global GDP. Megacities come with several unique challenges 
for governance and the provision of services to their populations, as well as for military 
intervention in the wake of natural or manmade disasters. This thesis asks the question: 
What do Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and Theater Special Operation 
Commands (TSOCs) need to know about megacities, and how can they improve the 
planning process to more rapidly assess, synchronize, and guide military interventions in 
megacities? The thesis proposes a four-part model—the Urban Intervention Model 
(UIM)—that allows military leaders to conduct a rapid assessment and plan for military 
intervention into a megacity in the wake of natural or manmade disasters. It then applies 
the UIM to a hypothetical case study, the megacity of Cairene following an earthquake, 
to demonstrate how planning staffs can use the model to plan for military intervention. 
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Increased urban migration and rapid population growth have resulted in more 
people living in cities than in rural areas for the first time in human history.1 This mass 
flow of people to urban centers has produced megacities, which are commonly defined as 
cities with 10 million or more residents.2 As of 2016, 12% of the world’s population lives 
in 36 megacities and that number will continue to rise, especially among developing 
nations. By 2030, experts estimate that 17 mega regions, hosting 60% of the world’s 
population, will account for 75% of the world’s GDP.3 A mega region is comprised of 
cities and towns that grew together to form one continuous urban space.4 
Megacities come with several unique challenges for governance and the provision 
of services to their populations. First, megacities have dense living conditions, which 
require continual competition for living space. In developing countries, rapid population 
growth often produces slums, or areas “where vacant state-owned or private land is 
occupied illegally.”5 Slums have unclear land ownership, poor quality construction, high 
rates of crime, and little or no access to services; each of these conditions challenges 
effective governance.6 By one estimate, up to one third of all urban dwellers live in 
slums, in conditions that overwhelm  the municipality’s ability to care for its inhabitants.7 
                                                
1.  David Kilcullen, “The City as A System: Future Conflict and Urban Resilience,” The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 2 (Summer 2012), 22. 
2.  United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects, The 2014 Revision Methodology, technical report 
no. WP.238 (New York, NY: United Nations, 2014), 238.   
3.  See, Joel Kotkin, The City: A Global History, 2005 modern library edition ed. (New York: Modern 
Library, 2005). 
4.  See, Richard L. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, Revisited (New York: Basic Books, 2012).; 
Joel Kotkin, The City: A Global History, Modern Library Edition ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2005). 
5.  Yerach Doytsher et al., Rapid Urbanization and Mega Cities: The Need for Spatial Information 
Management: Research Study, ed. Chryssy A. Potsiou, FIG Report 48 (Copenhagen, Denmark: 
International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), 2010), 7. 
6.  Doytsher et al., Rapid Urbanization and Mega, 20. 
7.  Doytsher et al., Rapid Urbanization and Mega, 20 
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Second, megacities often face challenges with providing and managing resources 
for their populations. Limited access to essential resources such as fresh food and potable 
water has placed many of the urban poor on the brink of starvation.8 Increasing traffic has 
caused widespread pollution, leading to increased levels of respiratory disease, in 
addition to causing massive traffic jams that literally last for days and hinder the effective 
distribution of resources and services.9 Governments also struggle with waste disposal, 
which has contaminated already strained water supplies.10 These conditions amplify the 
spread of infectious disease, which is another concern of megacities. 
Third, advances in technology, particularly information technology, have created 
challenges and opportunities for megacities.11 Connectedness through social media and 
the Internet has produced access to information that is rapidly and efficiently shared 
between residents in large municipalities. The connected nature of the city allows anyone, 
even those living in slums, to access global networks for the exchange of money and 
goods, allowing people of all backgrounds to conduct business across borders.12 
However, this connectedness also creates opportunities for criminals or insurgents; illicit 
actors can more efficiently organize, mobilize support, and often propagate information 
campaigns beyond the control of local authorities. 
Finally, megacities pose unique challenges for military intervention. The sheer 
number and density of people living in a megacity require greater security forces than are 
likely available. For example, a 16 to 1,000 force ratio in a megacity with 10 million 
residents would theoretically require 160,000 security forces to secure the city. This 
number exceeds the 120,000 American troops deployed for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
                                                
8.  “Food Deserts,” United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, accessed 
December 4, 2015. http://apps.ams.usda.gov/fooddeserts/ foodDeserts.aspx. 
9.  Michael Adeloye Adebamowo, “The Implication of Global Economic Recession on Sustainable 
Housing,” International Business Research 4, no. 1 (January 2011): 75. 
10.  Waste Management World. “Megacities,” Last modified January 4, 2012, accessed December 4, 
2015. http://waste-management-world.com/a/ talking-heads-megacities, 2. 
11.  David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 33. 
12.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32–33; “The Conduct of Future,” 12. 
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which was one of the largest military mobilizations since World War II.13 It is unlikely 
that any Western government would be able to field these numbers for stability 
operations, much less sustain them over a long period of time. 
Historical examples of foreign military intervention into large cities have 
demonstrated the many challenges posed by these operations. For example, United 
Nations’ and United States’ intervention in Mogadishu in 1993 showed how a city with 
weak government and expansive poverty could create the most challenging of 
environments for some of the best trained and most advanced militaries in the world.14 
Similarly, the 2010 Haitian earthquake that shook Port Au Prince stretched the resources 
of the entire international community.15 These problems would only compound in a 
megacity such as Rio de Janeiro with populations exceeding 10 million inhabitants and 
currently reaching as high as 38 million inhabitants in Tokyo-Yokohama. 
Megacities are a new kind of urban environment where nations have not tested 
traditional strategies and military force on such a grand scale. Despite this, military 
doctrine has not yet addressed these emerging environments. Western military leaders 
and organizations recognize that there are doctrinal gaps in their current understanding of 
large cities. The Chief of Staff of the Army, for example, convened a strategic studies 
group on megacities in 2014. The concept team concluded that, “It is inevitable that at 
some point the United States Army will be asked to operate in a megacity and currently 
the Army is ill-prepared to do so.”16 
NATO, the U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army, and United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) all list megacities among their top research priorities.17 
                                                
13.  Peter J. Krause, Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology for International Studies, February 2007, 1.  
14.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 84. 
15.  Gary Cecchine, The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for 
Army Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 40. 
16.  Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army,” 3, 8.  
17.   Brian A. Maher, comp., Special Operations Research Topics 2016 (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: 
The JSOU Press, 2015);  Henrik Sommer, “Calling Notice For The NATO Urbanisation Experiment, 20–25 
September 2015 at The Modelling And Simulation Centre of Excellence (M&S COE), Rome,” June 25, 
2015; Troxell, 2015-16 Key Strategic Issues, 9:  
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According to the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) created by the Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army, 
Unified land operations within [a] complex urban terrain is fast becoming 
a reality Army formations must contend with. Army doctrine fails to 
adequately grasp the complexity of large cities, megacities are not 
currently a unit of analysis within the Department of Defense intelligence 
community, and megacities and dense urban terrain are not featured in the 
defense planning scenarios which shape force composition or 
employment.18 
Similarly, the USSOCOM Command KSIL lists megacities among its top four 
research priorities. The USSOCOM KSIL poses the questions, “Is the megacity 
environment unique for SOF?,” and if so “What capabilities are required for 
understanding it and conducting the full range of SOF activities?”19 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis attempts to answer the following question: What do Geographic 
Combatant Commands (GCCs) and Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) need 
to know about megacities, and how can they improve the planning process to more 
rapidly assess, synchronize, and guide military operations in megacities? 
C. METHODOLOGY  
The thesis focuses on megacities and the military planning process for 
interventions. It begins by using the rich body of literature on megacities and 
urbanization. From this literature, the thesis provides a summary of common megacity 
characteristics, trends, and conditions relevant to military planners. The thesis also 
considers existing military doctrine from across Western militaries, and these doctrines’ 
ability to adequately inform megacity intervention. 
From this discussion, this thesis consults various planning and modeling 
techniques to propose a four-part model—the Urban Intervention Model (UIM)—that 
allows military leaders to conduct a rapid assessment and plan for military intervention 
                                                
18.  Troxell, 2015-16 Key Strategic Issues, 9. 
19.  Maher, Special Operations Research Topics, 48. 
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into a megacity in the wake of natural or manmade disasters. The thesis nests each step of 
the proposed model with existing doctrine and planning practices, and explains the utility 
each step of the model has for intervention planning.  
The thesis then uses the model to plan for a Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC) level intervention into a fictitious city of 18 million, Cairene, in the aftermath of 
a devastating earthquake. The TSOC’s intervention should address wide-scale human 
suffering and prevent regional destabilization. The chapter applies each step of the UIM 
to the problem and identifies key centers of gravity to target. This hypothetical 
intervention demonstrates how to use the model while incorporating principles from the 
megacity literature.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following this study of megacities and developing the UIM, this thesis offers 
three recommendations. First, the U.S and NATO forces should consider designating 
cities as a new operational domain. Rather than adapting current land warfare doctrine to 
urban terrain, making megacities an operational domain will allow for the development 
of more focused urban doctrine and strategy. Second, U.S. and NATO forces should 
develop inter-service, interagency, and international games and exercises that focus on 
multilateral intervention into megacities in the wake of natural or manmade disasters. 
Wargames increase experience and decision making skills, while exercises help identify 
capability gaps, improve cohesion, and streamline logistics during actual interventions.20 
Third, U.S. military and NATO forces should establish enduring relationships with 
civilian agencies and experts versed in the vulnerabilities and resiliencies of urban 
environments prior to interventions. Combining civilian and military expertise reduces 
capability caps while capitalizing on the strengths of multiple organizations. Pre-
coordinated relationships and on-the-ground cooperation may provide for a more rapid 
and cohesive response in a megacity intervention. 
                                                
20.  Bruce Stanley, “Wargames, Training, and Decision-Making. Increasing the Experience of Army 
Leaders” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2000), iii. 
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E. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of megacities, 
including offering a working definition of megacities, and unique challenges of 
governance and resources to megacities. Chapter II then uses this discussion to inform 
security concerns for military intervention. It details military considerations that highlight 
Western military’s unpreparedness to conduct operations in megacities. 
Chapter III begins by describing useful planning and conceptual models for 
understanding megacities from a military perspective. From this discussion, the chapter 
presents the UIM, a four-part model, and explains the UIM’s steps and sub-steps in 
detail. 
Chapter IV uses the UIM to plan a TSOC-led intervention into a fictitious 
megacity—Cairene—following an earthquake. It demonstrates how to apply each of the 
UIM steps within the scenario. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the wider 
application of the UIM and operational considerations for military planners.  
Chapter V concludes with proposals on how Geographic Combatant Commands 
(GCCs) and TSOCs can adapt their planning process to account for the complexity in a 
megacity. It will provide a list of recommendations for future megacity research related 
to military interventions. 
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II. WHAT IS A MEGACITY? 
Over the last century, accelerating population growth and increased 
industrialization have shifted human habitat from rural to urban centers, creating what 
has become known as megacities.21 Megacities present a number of challenges for 
governance, resource management, disease control, and crime management. Megacities 
also pose unique challenges to intervening military forces. According to a U.S. Army 
Strategic Studies Group, megacities are “blind spots from which strategic surprise could 
emerge.”22 
This chapter provides an overview of megacities and their unique challenges to 
security and intervening military forces. It begins with a brief summary of various 
descriptions of a megacity, providing a working definition that includes both population 
and density in territory. The chapter then explores trends and problems that affect 
megacities, highlighting that megacities are complex systems with vulnerabilities that 
will shape conflicts in the future. Finally, the chapter concludes with a detailed look at 
the challenges for military intervention in megacities, including existing military doctrine 
and its perspectives on intervention. 
A. WHAT IS A MEGACITY?  
Despite growing concern over larger and larger cities and the various challenges 
they present to governance and resources, there is no consensus on the definition of a 
megacity. The majority of researchers agree with the UN’s definition that a city with 10 
million or more inhabitants is a megacity.23 However, despite this simple definition that 
relies solely on one variable (population), calculating the sheer number of inhabitants of a 
megacity is difficult. One method of counting inhabitants requires using existing census 
                                                
21.  United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance 
Tables, Technical Report No. ESA/P/WP.241, (n.p; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division, 2015), 2. 
22.  Marc Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and 
Uncertain Future,” (Arlington: U.S. Military, 2014), 21. 
23.  United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects, The 2014 Revision Methodology, technical report 
no. WP.238 (New York, NY: United Nations, 2014), 238. 
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or population registers to identify the number of people living in a city. In this case, the 
country in which the city resides reports both the city’s boundaries and its number of 
inhabitants. The UN report on megacities, for example, relies on census data from each 
city to arrive at its list of megacities, which it updates every two years. It notes: 
No attempts have been made to impose consistency in definitions across 
countries. However, several efforts are underway at different institutions 
to produce globally comparable estimates of the urban population with 
uniform criteria to define urban areas based on satellite imagery of land 
cover or night-time lights.24 
Another method of measuring the inhabitants of megacities uses satellite imagery. 
For example, Wendell Cox, a municipal public policy expert, uses the satellite land cover 
imagery methodology to determine both land area and population in a megacity. Cox’s 
approach, in other words, allows him to calculate urban space regardless of 
administrative boundaries.25 For example, Chongqing, China technically has the largest 
population of any city in the world, but its administrative territory is roughly equivalent 
to an area close to the size of Austria.26 By contrast, Dhaka, Bangladesh has 14.6 million 
residents within 125 square miles making it the most densely populated city in the world. 
To put this further in perspective, the New York urban area is only 1/20th the density of 
Dhaka.27 Cox’s annual research report states that, as of January 2015, 34 cities had 10 
million or more inhabitants, as opposed to the UN list that has only 28 megacities.28 Due 
to the way population estimates are gathered, there is a debate over the 20% discrepancy 
between the UN and Demographia.29 See Tables 1 and 2 for demographia and United 
Nations data. 
                                                
24.  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Methodology, 3. 
25.  Wendell Cox, Demographia World Urban Areas, 11th Annual Edition, Demographia World 
Urban Areas 2015:01 (Belleville, IL: Wendell Cox Consultancy, 2015): accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf, 7. 
26.  Cox, “Demographia World Urban Areas,” 6. 
27.  Wendell Cox, “Evolving Urban Form: Dhaka,” New Geography, last modified August 8, 2012, 
accessed January 27, 2016, http://www.newgeography.com/content/003004-evolving-urban-form-dhaka. 
28.  Cox, “Demographia World Urban Areas.” 7. 
29.  Cox, “Demographia World Urban Areas,” 7. 
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Table 1.   Demographia 2015 Megacities30 
Rank 2015 Country Urban Area Population  Density 
1 Japan Tokyo-Yokohama 37,843,000 4,400 
2 Indonesia Jakarta 30,539,000 9,500 
3 India Delhi, DL-UP-HR 24,998,000 12,100 
4 Philippines Manila 24,123,000 15,300 
5 South Korea Seoul-Incheon 23,480,000 10,400 
6 China Shanghai, SHG-JS-ZJ 23,416,000 6,100 
7 Pakistan Karachi 22,123,000 23,400 
8 China Beijing, BJ 21,009,000 5,500 
9 United States New York, NY-NJ-CT 20,630,000 1,800 
10 China Guangzhou-Foshan, GD 20,597,000 6,000 
11 Brazil Sao Paulo 20,365,000 7,500 
12 Mexico Mexico City 20,063,000 9,700 
13 India Mumbai, MH 17,712,000 32,400 
14 Japan Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto 17,444,000 5,400 
15 Russia Moscow 16,170,000 3,500 
16 Bangladesh Dhaka 15,669,000 43,500 
17 Egypt Cairo 15,600,000 8,900 
18 United States Los Angeles, CA 15,058,000 2,400 
19 Thailand Bangkok 14,998,000 5,800 
20 India Kolkata, WB 14,667,000 12,200 
21 Argentina Buenos Aires 14,122,000 5,300 
22 Iran Tehran 13,532,000 9,100 
23 Turkey Istanbul 13,287,000 9,800 
24 Nigeria Lagos 13,123,000 14,500 
25 China Shenzhen, GD 12,084,000 6,900 
26 Brazil Rio de Janeiro 11,727,000 5,800 
27 Congo (Dem. Rep.) Kinshasa 11,587,000 19,900 
28 China Tianjin 10,920,000 5,400 
29 France Paris 10,858,000 3,800 
30 Peru Lima 10,750,000 11,700 
31 China Chengdu, SC 10,376,000 6,700 
32 United Kingdom London 10,236,000 5,900 
33 Japan Nagoya 10,177,000 2,600 






                                                
30.  Adapted from: Cox, “Demographia World Urban Areas.” 
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Table 2.   United Nations 2014 Megacities31 
Rank 2014 Country Urban Agglomeration 2014 
1 Japan Tokyo 37,833,000 
2 India Delhi 24,953,000 
3 China Shanghai 22,991,000 
4 Mexico Ciudad de México (Mexico City) 20,843,000 
5 Brazil São Paulo 20,831,000 
6 India Mumbai (Bombay) 20,741,000 
7 Japan Kinki M.M.A. (Osaka) 20,123,000 
8 China Beijing 19,520,000 
9 United States of America New York-Newark 18,591,000 
10 Egypt Al-Qahirah (Cairo) 18,419,000 
11 Bangladesh Dhaka 16,982,000 
12 Pakistan Karachi 16,126,000 
13 Argentina Buenos Aires 15,024,000 
14 India Kolkata (Calcutta) 14,766,000 
15 Turkey Istanbul 13,954,000 
16 China Chongqing 12,916,000 
17 Brazil Rio de Janeiro 12,825,000 
18 Philippines Manila 12,764,000 
19 Nigeria Lagos 12,614,000 
20 United States of America Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 12,308,000 
21 Russian Federation Moskva (Moscow) 12,063,000 
22 China Guangzhou, Guangdong 11,843,000 
23 Democratic Republic of the Congo Kinshasa 11,116,000 
24 China Tianjin 10,860,000 
25 France Paris 10,764,000 
26 China Shenzhen 10,680,000 
27 United Kingdom London 10,189,000 
28 Indonesia Jakarta 10,176,000 
    
 
In addition to measuring population density, satellite imagery can also measure 
economic activity over a large contiguous urban area that may include multiple cities and 
metropolitan areas. Timothy Gulden, a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Center 
for International and Security Studies, uses night-time lights to estimate the amount of 
economic activity in urban areas, what he calls light-based regional product (LRP).32 LRP 
data is best used to measure economic activity across a large contiguous urban region 
                                                
31.  Adapted from: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings 
and Advance Tables, Technical Report No. ESA/P/WP.241, (n.p; United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015) 
32.  Richard L. Florida, Who’s Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live the 
Most Important Decision of Your Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 22. 
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with populations ranging from five to 100 million inhabitants.33 This method is able to 
generate globally comparable economic vitality between city regions, but it comes with 
challenges, namely delineating between cities and sprawling populations that cover 
several cities. While Gulden’s approach has been successful in showing the economic 
vitality of a region, it has not yet included population data, nor has it been applied to 
define a megacity alone.  
Another approach to defining megacities comes from the Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army, who convened a Strategic Studies Group on Megacities. The group’s 
emphasizes the following criteria: context, scale, density, connectedness, flow and threats 
as criteria for understanding the qualitative nature of a megacity.34 It argues that a useful 
typology for categorizing cities is revealed when these criteria are considered alongside 
drivers of instability and a government’s ability to meet demands for services and 
security amid rising insecurity and strained capacity. The report further states, “one of the 
hallmarks of megacities is rapid hetero and homogeneous population growth that 
outstrips city governance capability.”35 
Building on these points, current megacities exist in both the developed and 
developing world, but current trends suggest that the number and size of megacities will 
grow in the developing world.36 Furthermore, megacities in developing countries tend to 
outpace their ability to build adequate infrastructure and meet their populations’ 
demands. Therefore, it is helpful to consider developed and developing megacities 
separately. The report goes on to note that the level of dysfunction among megacities in 
the developing world is greater than that in the developed world due to an overwhelming 
                                                
33.  Florida, Who’s Your City?: How the Creative, 41. 
34.  Mark Lomedico and Elizabeth M. Bartels, “City As a System Analytical Framework: A Structured 
Analytical Approach to Understanding and Acting in Urban Environments,” Small Wars Journal, August 4, 
2015: accessed January 15, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/city-as-a-system-analytical-
framework-a-structured-analytical-approach-to-understanding-and, 10. 
35.  Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army,” 12. 
36.  Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army,” 4. 
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lack of integration of the public, private, and commercial sectors, which makes them 
vulnerable to a variety of security concerns.37 
In sum, regardless of the method used to measure population, megacities are 
universally defined in terms of numerical population data, with the current number at 10 
million or more. However, defining a megacity based on this single factor fails to capture 
the dynamics that make such high numbers significant. Furthermore, such heavy 
emphasis on a numerically-based definition implies that all megacities are the same once 
they reach a certain population threshold. Megacities, like all cities, should be understood 
as multiple complex systems that support an urban population within a bounded space. 
B. PROBLEMS AND TRENDS THAT AFFECT MEGACITIES  
In addition to creating a working definition of a megacity, it is also important to 
identify key trends that affect megacities. An important consideration in the emergence of 
megacities is what military strategist and counter insurgency expert David Kilcullen calls 
“conflict climate.”38 Kilcullen specifically describes three megatrends that affect the 
conflict climate for urban environments: population growth and urbanization, 
littoralization, and connectedness.39 Population growth and urbanization will result in a 
world urban population of over six billion by 2050, with the majority living in the 
world’s poorest areas. According to Kilcullen this will be, “a recipe for conflict, for crises 
in health, education, and governance, and for food, energy, and water scarcity.”40 
Kilcullen describes littoralization as the tendency for people to cluster on coastlines and 
bodies of water. He notes, that as of 2012, 80% of the world’s population lived within 
fifty miles of the ocean. Megacities are no exception with 84% of the world’s megacities 
being situated on a coast or major river delta at the turn of the century.41 These areas will 
                                                
37.  Harris et al., “Megacities and the United States Army,” 12–14. 
38.  David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 27–28, 240. 
39.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 30 
40.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29 
41.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 30. 
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be key terrain in future conflicts as “an increasing proportion of the world’s population, 
economic activity and military capability will be centered in the coastal cities.”42 
Additionally, Kilcullen notes the importance of “connectedness” in megacities. 
Connectedness means that access to services and information is rapidly and efficiently 
shared between residents in large municipalities. The connected nature of the city allows 
anyone to tap global networks for the exchange of money and to conduct business across 
borders.43 Propagation of technology in the developing world since 2000 has ensured that 
slums, businesses, and governments alike will remain connected to their networks of 
associates, friends, and family. While increased use of technologies facilitate 
connectedness and may have benefits to governments, it also creates opportunities for 
criminal or insurgents to more efficiently organize and propagate information campaigns 
to garner public support for illicit activities.44 Kilcullen further contends that the three 
megatrends will be predominant in the “Global South,” a term synonymous with the 
developing world.45 
Another report that notes future trends and challenges with megacities comes 
from the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC). In 2012, the NIC published “Global 
Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.”46 The report identifies four critical “megatrends” 
likely to occur (individual empowerment, diffusion of power, demographic patterns, and 
food, water, energy nexus, see Appendix A), six critical factors, or “game changers” 
(crises-prone global economy, governance gap, increased conflict, wider scoped regional 
instability, new technological impacts, and the role of the United States, see Appendix 
A), that will influence future realities, and six “tectonic shifts” that are likely to occur 
(growth of the middle class, wider access to lethal and disruptive technologies, definitive 
shift of economic power to the East and South, unprecedented and widespread aging, 
                                                
42.  David J. Kilcullen, “The Conduct of Future Operations in the Urban Littoral, and its Implications 
for NATO” (unpublished, 2015), 12. 
43.  Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32–33; “The Conduct of Future Operations,” 12. 
44.  Kilcullen, The Conduct of Future Operations, 19. 
45.  Kilcullen, The Conduct of Future Operations, 1. 
46.  Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds: a Publication of the National Intelligence Council 
(December 2012; National Intelligence Council, 2012). 
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urbanization, and food and water pressures, see Appendix A).47 The four critical 
megatrends conclude that megacities may become limited by physical land constraints, 
vehicular congestion, costly infrastructure, deteriorating sanitation, increased criminal 
networks, and political gridlock.48 Furthermore, the six “tectonic shifts” will all have 
implications for megacities in the future. For example, competition for fresh water and 
land will increase tensions over water rights, water quality, and territorial expansion. The 
tensions will manifest legal actions, civic demand for state intervention, and policy 
reform.49 
The NIC report states that smart cities, or “urban environments that leverage 
information-technology-based solutions to maximize economic productivity and quality 
of life while maximizing resource consumption and environmental degradation,” are 
emerging as a key characteristic of the most advanced megacities, like New York and 
London.50 In order to create the systems required to govern megacities with smart 
technology, investments in infrastructure are needed. The enormous scale, complexity 
and costs of implementing new technologies to create smart cities are not likely without 
the appropriate flow of income to municipal governments. Furthermore, the report posits 
that heavy investment in smart-city infrastructure in urban centers of Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia will lead to the epicenter of smart-city innovation moving, away from 
Europe and North America by 2030.51 Finally, the report hypothesizes that, when smart 
city technology is implemented, it will form the foundation for city planning and disaster 
and emergency response.52 
Another vulnerability facing megacities comes from their slums. Up to one third 
of all urban dwellers, live in slums that have exceeded the municipality’s ability to care 
                                                
47.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, ii. 
48.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, 29. 
49.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, 29. 
50.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, 89. 
51.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, 90. 
52.  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, 89. 
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for its inhabitants.53 The International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), a UN-recognized 
organization, points to how slums will affect megacities in its report, “Rapid 
Urbanization and Mega Cities: The Need for Spatial Information Management.”54 The 
report defines slums or informal settlements as the locations “where vacant state-owned 
or private land is occupied illegally and is used for illegal slum housing.”55 Because of 
this, governments have provided little or no services.56 Slums have unclear land 
ownership, poor quality construction, high rates of crime, little or no access to services, 
and are in violation of land-use zoning.57 The report further notes that, in 2010, 70% of 
urban population growth occurred outside of formal planning and 30% of developing 
nations’ urban population lived in slums or settlements where land is occupied illegally.58 
Alongside these statistics, 90% of new settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, 
qualify as slums.59 Currently one billion people live in slums, and by 2020 the number 
will likely grow to 1.4 billion.60 
Another challenge in megacities is “feralization.” Feralization is the process by 
which poor, informal areas, including slums, become ‘wild’ and insubordinate to formal 
governance.61 According to Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, professors of Development 
Studies at Utrech University, feralization results in “urban excluded” who rely upon 
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informal systems to fulfill the needs that are not met by governments.62 These systems 
take the form of black markets, gangs, and other illicit institutions. The services provided 
by these informal systems may range from criminal to civic service; however, the key 
distinction is that governments are not providing these services, so informal or extra-
governmental entities fill the void.63 Formal structures are forced to confront this 
‘parallel’ informal structure in what Koonings and Kruijt describe as low intensity 
conflict. The authors state, “In many cases the local state is drawn into a perverse spiral 
of escalating violence, crime and arbitrary conduct that is transforming the cityscape into 
a theatre of low intensity warfare.”64 Formal governments often resort to repressive 
means while attempting to regain control in these feral areas. Repression in turn furthers 
spatial segregation, stigmatization and violence, all of which deepen mistrust between the 
population and the government.65 These areas become the center of a contentious and 
often violent struggle for control between competing systems of governance.66 
Yet another growing trend in megacities is their interconnectedness, which is both 
an opportunity and a vulnerability. An example of this interconnected vulnerability 
comes from the 2008 global financial crisis. University of Lagos engineer Michael 
Adebawomo describes how the crisis, which originated in the United States, triggered 
negative effects for the economic wellbeing of businesses in Lagos, Nigeria: 
Businesses across all sectors suffer a serious decline in sales turnover and 
their profits shrink, borrowers default on repayment of loans, banking 
system breaks down, prices of food, fuel and other essential commodities 
shoot up, value of houses drops, and companies offer voluntary retirement 
programs to reduce their workforce and cut down wages.67 
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Fiscal policies established abroad now have broad tangible effects in foreign economies 
and specific effects in megacities that are directly tied to the foreign corporations that 
operate in them. When foreign economies are healthy wealth can flow freely into 
megacity economies, but severe economic decline can have disproportionate effects. 
Another challenge in megacities is resource scarcity. Some examples of resource 
scarcity include reduced access to essential resources necessary for consumption or the 
limited ability to effectively dispose of waste; these limits can rapidly overwhelm a city’s 
physical infrastructure. For instance, according to the Community Health Councils Food 
Development Working Group, Los Angeles contains vast areas where its residents 
experience inadequate access to fresh food.68 These “food deserts,” which contribute to 
diabetes and heart disease, are defined as an urban location greater than one mile away 
from adequate food markets.69 Delhi, India provides a useful example of how reduced 
access to potable water has triggered new problems for its citizens and government. The 
sustainable carrying capacity for Delhi’s water infrastructure is estimated to be 7.8 
million people. 2015 estimates claim that the country is approaching water depletion with 
a population of 24.9 million and a water consumption demand of 14.1 billion liters/day. 
As a result, bathing and commercial use of water is limited. Furthermore, due to the high 
demand for water, a black market has emerged that the city government is unable to 
stop.70 This dynamic shows the challenges of megacities in managing finite and critical 
resources. 
Management of waste is another critical challenge that plagues many megacities. 
Physicist and environmental activist Soni Vikram notes in a study that waste management 
is consistently among the top five concerns for city mayors worldwide.71 Currently the 
world’s cities produce 1.3 billion tons of municipal solid waste (MSW) per year, and if 
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current urbanization trends continue, that number will reach 2.2 billion tons by 2025.72 
Although biological waste may be converted to energy if the appropriate infrastructure is 
in place, MSW is increasingly non-biological due to greater use of disposable consumer 
goods, and therefore not easily transformed into energy.73 Inadequate waste disposal can 
lead to contamination of water and communities.74 These conditions, when coupled with 
poor sanitation and an inadequate healthcare system, can accelerate the spread of 
infectious diseases like Cholera, SARS or H5N1 bird flu in dense urban areas. 
Air pollution is another challenge of megacities. Since the beginning of the 
industrial age, urban dwellers have struggled with smog, the byproduct of burning wood 
and fossil fuels. This trend reached its zenith among developed megacities in the mid-
20th century, with smog causing an estimated 4,000 deaths per week in London and 
causing similar problems in Los Angeles.75 Since that time, government policies have 
reduced industrial emissions in the developed world. However, air pollution is still 
considered to be the world’s single largest health risk according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO).76 The WHO released a statement in 2014 stating that, in 2012, 
over seven million people died due to the effects of air pollution.77 Air pollution will 
continue to be a challenge as populations grow and urbanization rates rise in mega cities. 
Automotive traffic and congestion are yet further challenges for megacities. 
Increased economic affluence has allowed for the proliferation of individual automobile 
ownership.78 In addition to the added pollution this causes, traffic congestion is a part of 
life in the world’s megacities. Widespread congestion and traffic jams can literally last 
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for days in places like Lagos, Nigeria.79 To reduce congestion, London implemented a 
plan restricting areas of the city from vehicle traffic or charging a fee for access. 
Although this plan reduced congestion, emissions were increased because vehicles could 
travel faster and produced greater emissions than in traffic jams.80 Mexico City counters 
their congestion through the implementation of a “no drive day”; however, this scheme 
has proved difficult to enforce.81 
The volume and complexity of megacities tests governments’ abilities to deliver 
essential services, provide adequate governance, and enforce security on a daily basis. 
However, in addition to the present and future challenges mentioned above, providing 
security—and particularly military intervention to megacities—becomes its own unique 
challenge. 
C. MILITARY CHALLENGES FOR OPERATIONS IN MEGACITIES 
Megacities pose unique challenges for militaries tasked to conduct humanitarian 
assistance, disaster response, low-intensity conflict and high-intensity operations. For 
over two decades, numerous academics and military practitioners have called for new 
urban warfare strategies and capabilities designed to prepare for and meet these 
challenges.82 For example, Kenneth Hewitt, a geographic and environmental expert, 
observed in 1983, “urban places and their geography, in particular, are deeply embroiled 
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in preparations for and consequences of war. There is even reciprocity between war and 
cities.”83 Michael Evans, a military and security expert, observed in 2007 that “war and 
cities appear to be redefining themselves in terms of space, scale, time, mobility, and 
power because of globalization and the diffusion of technology.”84 These trends 
foreshadow the centrality of urban conflict in the future, especially in littoral regions.85 
The U.S. and other militaries have already found themselves engaging in urban 
combat. Randy Gangle, a security and urban warfighting expert states that, between 1982 
and 2002, U.S. military forces were involved in 26 conflicts; 21 included urban fighting 
and 10 were exclusively urban, including Beirut, Panama City, Mogadishu, Port Au 
Prince, and Grenada and Balkans. Post 9/11 interventions, like Baghdad and Fallujah in 
Iraq and Kandahar in Afghanistan, confirmed the reality that western militaries will 
continue to engage in urban combat, including in megacities. 
Academics and practitioners describe several unique challenges that megacities 
create for intervening forces. For example, conflict and security researcher Alice Hills 
notes that cities are a “complex multidimensional blend of horizontal, vertical, interior 
and external forms, super imposed on natural relief. Ground maneuver becomes 
multidimensional.”86 Hills further notes that democracies have tried to avoid armed urban 
hostilities due to the nature of attrition. She contends that in an increasingly urbanized 
world, this objective will be less feasible than in the past and that strategists need to 
reconcile the emerging realities of urban combat with casualty risk aversion.87 
Military operations in megacities also challenge Western reliance on technology. 
Stephen Graham, a city and urban life security researcher, notes that urban warfare 
“undermines the United States’ expensively assembled and hegemonic advantages in 
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surveillance, targeting and killing through precise air- and space-based weapon 
systems.”88 In other words, Western militaries’ ability to surveil and target from the air is 
severely limited in dense megacities. Hills argues that technological innovations tend to 
undermine advanced technological superiority because opponents hide among the urban 
population and maintain anonymity.89 Hills further notes that historic examples have 
shown that militaries involved in intense urban confrontations failed to uphold the rules 
of engagements aimed to protect the population.90 Therefore, Hills asserts that fighting in 
an urban environment requires highly trained forces with strong morals and ethics, not 
greater technology.91 
The U.S. military has written several publications and field manuals devoted to 
urban operations. The overarching inter-service manual, Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, 
defines joint urban operations as “joint operations planned and conducted on, or against 
objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-
made construction or the density of population are the dominant features.”92 It recognizes 
urban operations as a subcomponent of larger land operations.93 Urban characteristics 
and conditions, such as complex man-made physical terrain, dense human population, 
and the presence of life sustaining infrastructure, are underscored while there is little 
emphasis on the people and systems that make up a city.94 Although urban topographical 
features and population density dominate the text and its interpretation of what is 
important within an urban environment, this is to an extent a reflection of the joint 
publication’s role in synchronizing the joint functions of command and control, 
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment in an urban 
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environment.95 Rather than outlining a comprehensive approach to urban combat, the 
intent of JP 3-06 is to provide a framework for managing and deconflicting joint 
operations. 
In addition to joint doctrine, individual U.S. services have their own urban 
doctrinal publications. One example is the Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-06, Urban 
Operations.96 The purpose of this manual is to provide forces with the tools to evaluate 
an urban environment and its potential effects on military operations, including how to 
apply the doctrinal principles of Unified Land Operations found in Army Doctrinal 
Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–0, Unified Land Operations.97 FM 3-06 provides a 
historical context of urban operations, noting operations in Beirut and Mogadishu, while 
stressing the need to understand the urban adversary as adaptive and asymmetric.98 
As of 2016, NATO lacks doctrine for urban operations. However, to fill this gap, 
NATO established an Urban Operations Working Group in 2011 with the aim of 
developing a cohesive Allied Tactical Publication (ATP), that will standardize urban 
doctrine across the NATO alliance. Once complete, this doctrine will provide the basis 
for tactical training events and future urban response.99 
Neither U.S. doctrine nor NATO specifically address urban operations within the 
context of a megacity and the unique problems posed by population density, slums, and 
urban sprawl. Rather than viewing the city as a unique operating environment, urban 
warfare remains a component of traditional land warfare techniques. Specifically, both JP 
3-06 and FM 3-06 propose two conventional means of conducting operations in or 
around large cities: encircle and thus isolate a city; and, second, secure the outskirts of 
the city and then maneuver to its center with the aim of controlling the city.100 Within 
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both of these conventional strategies, the goal is to counter an opposing force through 
short-term conventional combat operations. These approaches are unlikely to succeed 
when confronted with the sheer population size and challenges that intervention in a 
megacity pose. 
The Australian Department of Defense drafted a whitepaper in 2014 that aimed to 
address some of the unique challenges of military operations in megacities.101 The 
Directorate of Future Land Warfare paper titled “The Australian Army in the Urban, 
Networked Littoral.” challenges the current doctrinal view that cities are “static, like 
landscape” and proposes instead that the military should think of them as “living systems 
that change continuously.”102 The whitepaper further advocates viewing cities as 
“complex flow systems—of people, money, information, goods, construction materials, 
food, water, fuel and energy—overlaid on a physical framework that shapes flows and, 
over time, is shaped by them.”103 The whitepaper also notes that the scale of littoral 
megacities is “too vast for expeditionary forces to achieve the troop densities 
recommended in current doctrine.”104 
Building on this observation, perhaps one of the most critical challenges for 
military intervention in megacities is massing the sheer number of troops required to 
conduct operations in a dense environment with limited space. The most contemporary 
and widely accepted method to determine required troop numbers, especially for 
counterinsurgency, stability and civil support operations, is built on the force to 
population density ratio.105 Since 2006, U.S. Army plans have been predicated on the 
assumption of operating with 20 to 25 security forces per 1,000 members of the 
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population, based on a model designed by RAND analyst James Quinlivan.106 In 
contrast, military expert John McGrath promotes a lower troop density of 13 security 
forces per 1,000 members of the population.107 Other defense experts, such as Steve 
Goode, argue for a ratio of 11 to 1,000.108 The Institute for Defense Analysis advocates 
that a force ratio of 16 to1,000 results in a 50% chance of success, while a ratio of 40 to 
1,000 produces a 75% chance of success.109 See Tables 3 and 4 for force ratios. 
Table 3.   Force Ratio and Security Force Size for Urban Populations up to 5 
Million110 
 Force Ratio 100,000 500, 000 1 Million 5 Million 
Goode 11: 1,000 1,100 5,500 11,000 55,000 
McGrath 13: 1,000 1,300 6,500 13,000 65,000 
IDA 50% 16: 1,000 1,600 8,000 16,000 80,000 
U.S. Army  
(2006-Present) 
20: 1,000 2,000 10,000 20,000 100,000 
IDA 75% 40: 1,000 4,000 20,000 40,000 200,000 
 
Table 4.   Force Ratio for Megacities111 
 Force Ratio 10 Million 15 Million 20 Million 30 Million 
Goode 11: 1,000 110,000 165,000 220,000 330,000 
McGrath 13: 1,000 130,000 195,000 260,000 390,000 
IDA 50% 16: 1,000 160,000 240,000 320,000 480,000 
U.S. Army  
(2006-Present) 
20: 1,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 600,000 
IDA 75% 40: 1,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,200,000 
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Following these assumptions, an intervention with a 16 to 1,000 force ratio in a 
megacity with 10 million residents would require 160,000 security forces to guarantee a 
50% chance of success. This number is approximately 29% higher than the 120,000 
American troops originally deployed for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was one of 
the largest military mobilizations since World War II.112 An increase to a 75% chance of 
success would have required 400,000 troops. 
However, as the above ratios demonstrate, the sheer number of troops required to 
conventionally occupy a city is politically, and in some cases, logistically impossible. 
Furthermore, these ratios only address troop strength and do not account for associated 
considerations such as the time and resources required to mobilize, deploy, and mass an 
appropriately sized force. How militaries choose to infiltrate a megacity will also present 
unique challenges. Metropolitan areas, where cities merge together can hamper the 
insertion of forces due to the lack of large open spaces to mass troops. Restricted terrain 
for entry and staging areas make intervening forces predictable to the adversary. This 
predictability increases risk to forces regardless of insertion by land, sea or air.113 For 
these reasons, interventions in megacities will require new approaches to compensate for 
the lack of troops and available time. 
As previously mentioned, the feralization trend is another concern for intervening 
militaries. The feral environment produces feral adversaries that operate out of densely 
populated areas and use the population as a human shield.114 Western militaries are 
compelled to employ conventional tactics, which were not designed for the urban 
environment and may have a negative impact on the population.115 Paz asserts that the 
relationship between these adversaries and the population has fundamentally changed. In 
the past, insurgents needed support in terms of “guns, money and people” from the local 
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population.116 Through “glocalization,” a combination of local and global, “feral” actors 
have a sphere of control that goes far beyond the boundaries of a city. Increasingly, 
insurgencies have access to global funding, recruiting and technology in megacities. In 
the extreme case, Paz argues that this could create a dynamic where “the insurgent is the 
captor, and the population is the hostage.”117 
Furthermore, Paz argues that Western nations are disadvantaged in combating 
urban insurgencies, particularly in their ability to react to rapidly changing situations. 
Their strategies and tactics are driven by technology and not by the assessment of the 
threat. By contrast, insurgencies form the strategy and tactics around their political end-
state. They are highly flexible and can easily and quickly adapt. Furthermore, they 
leverage their efforts through extensive use of the media by promoting their ideas and 
undermining the legitimacy of their opponents.118 
As megacities increasingly become more prominent, they will continue to 
challenge military capacity and capability to intervene. Keith Dickson summarizes the 
urban military environment in the following way: “For Western military forces, 
asymmetric warfare in urban areas will be the greatest challenges of this century […] The 
City will be the strategic high ground—whoever controls it will dictate the course of 
future events in the world.”119 Megacities are uncertain environments that challenge 
Western military’s ability to conduct effective operations given currently accepted force 
ratios, technological gaps, doctrinal shortcomings, and the absence of existing public 
policies for megacity intervention. Furthermore, military forces will most likely be 
required to perform across the spectrum of military operations while intervening in 
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megacities. The simultaneity of these operations requires a high degree of adaptability 
and situational awareness.120 
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter began by providing an overview of what constitutes a megacity, 
noting the importance of moving beyond just population to include density and urban 
boundaries. The chapter then highlighted problems and trends that affect megacities, 
including population growth and urbanization, littoralization, connectedness, slums, and 
challenges to governance. The final section introduced challenges to intervening forces in 
megacities, noting the significance of scale with respect to force ratios, and doctrinal 
considerations for interpreting the operational environment. 
The next chapter will examine currently existing and emerging military analytical 
frameworks that apply to megacities. It will also introduce the Urban Intervention Model 
(UIM), a planning framework suited to the complexity of megacities. This framework 
assists planners with analyzing problems that face megacities and organizing urban 
interventions. 
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III. URBAN INTERVENTION MODEL 
Chapter II presented an overview of megacities and their unique characteristics. 
Chapter II noted, in particular, that megacities in developing countries struggle with 
resource management, disease control, and crime management problems, along with 
slums and ambiguous land boundaries, which provide daily challenges for effective 
governance. These factors make military intervention in megacities difficult particularly 
because they are not static terrain but rather “living systems that change continuously.”121 
Chapter II also noted that the tactics outlined in Joint Urban Operations (JP 3-06) do not 
adequately address these various challenges;122 new doctrinal considerations are 
necessary for assessing the operational environment.123  
Chapter III uses key concepts in military planning and evaluation—Operational 
Art and Design, the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), and case-based reasoning 
(CBR)— along with principles from conceptual modeling, including the analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP), to build an easy-to-use model for military intervention in 
megacities, the Urban Intervention Model (UIM). This model informs staffs responsible 
for planning and executing megacity interventions in Geographic Combatant Commands 
(GCC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC). 
A. OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS AND MEASURING EFFECTS 
TSOCs and U.S. joint staffs employ Operational Art and Design at the beginning 
of a campaign planning process. This method helps a commander identify the goals of a 
campaign or intervention. These goals are the commander’s desired end states. End states 
define what the campaign should achieve and outline the required conditions for 
success.124 Next, the staff identifies Centers of Gravity (COG) in relation to the end state. 
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Joint Publication 3–0 defines Centers of Gravity as, “The source of power that provides 
moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”125 COGs help staffs 
determine where to direct the main focus of military action. The direction of military 
action against COGs sets the conditions for success that bring about the desired end state.  
At this point, staffs begin to apply the JOPP. This planning process provides a 
template that addresses the identification of COGs in Operational Art and Design. The 
first step of the JOPP calls for commanders to select objectives to assess vulnerabilities in 
the COG.126 Upon completion of the mission analysis, the JOPP process focuses on the 
development of the courses of action, war-gaming, the comparison and selection of 
courses of action (COAs), and plan approval.127 Planning staffs should ensure that COAs 
achieve the commander’s objectives during operational planning. Objectives within 
COAs should nest with a COG to ensure that military action achieves the commander’s 
end state.128 Staffs should also develop measures of performance (MOPs), the assessment 
of tactical actions taken by a unit to achieve an objective, and measure of effectiveness 
(MOEs), the assessment of actions on an objective, to evaluate progress towards an 
objective.129 Staffs use MOPs to ensure that troops execute an action properly and use 
MOEs to ensure that tactical actions achieve desired results. Together, MOPs and MOEs 
provide a feedback mechanism that allows commanders to evaluate mission success 
against an objective.  
Commanders and staffs continually reevaluate MOPs and MOEs throughout the 
execution of a campaign to ensure that units meet objectives. However, unless directed 
by the commander, planners do not revisit COG analysis to ensure objectives remain 
nested with the end state. As a result, units can continually achieve their objectives 
according to all measures of effectiveness and still never achieve decisive gains against 
their long-term end state. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense’s excessive focus 
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on an enemy body count led commanders in the Vietnam War to assume they were 
making decisive gains against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In 
reality, commanders did not know the true effect of their actions on enemy strength; body 
counts did not reveal the effects of tactical actions on the enemy.130 Conversely, the U.S. 
military in Operation Iraqi Freedom reasoned that the reduction of coalition casualties 
was a MOE of suppressing the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat. In some cases, 
IED incidents actually rose but improved IED protection meant that fewer deaths resulted 
from contact.131 In both cases, the military pursued MOEs nested with objectives that had 
no significant bearing on the enemy COG. See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Planning Relationships Between – Centers of Gravity, Objectives, and 
Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness. 
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Ideally, planners should include a continual revision of COG analysis alongside 
the operations cycle and JOPP. One reason that operational planners may not reevaluate 
their COG analysis is because they lack sufficient data. Megacities are no exception to 
this reality; they are extremely complex and fluid and often have multiple, dynamic, and 
quickly changing COGs. As will be argued, rather than attempting to identify and isolate 
one single COG, it would be more useful for staff planners to adopt a model that accounts 
for complexity and scalability in megacity interventions. For example, a planning staff 
could create feedback mechanisms that show changes in the environment relative to the 
desired operational end state; this approach would allow planners to adapt and modify 
courses of action in real time.  
B. CASE BASED REASONING (CBR) 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is the process of adaptive problem solving.132 CBR 
is a foundational concept in the experiential learning model (ELM), a method of training 
and conditioning heavily employed by Special Operations Forces (SOF).133 ELM focuses 
on scenario-based training that compels forces to adapt their responses in order to achieve 
a current desired outcome. For example, in a training scenario, a shooter enters a room 
with only a set of conditions in mind that will drive him to shoot (e.g., a person is aiming 
a gun) or not shoot (e.g., a person is not aiming a gun). Once he is proficient in exercising 
this model, new variables are introduced into the room for him to process. Performance 
coaches provide immediate feedback so the shooter can more accurately pinpoint flaws in 
his thought process, make corrections, and reengage the problem. Over time, the shooter 
builds an adaptable mindset that allows him to rapidly interpret new information about 
his operational environment and adjust his actions accordingly.134 
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Planners can use CBR and ELM to provide a structure for an adaptive decision-
making process when intervening in a megacity.135 CBR allows the incorporation of 
information into decision making through feedback mechanisms, which require continual 
reassessment of the environment, resulting in a deliberate change of military action.136 
Although this method of processing information appears natural, efforts to exercise 
command and control and a dense bureaucratic decision-making process often hinders its 
application.137 While CBR may not immediately generate the optimal solution to a 
problem, its rapid execution makes it a useful method for processing information in a 
complex and emergent environment posed by megacities. 
C. MULTI CRITERIA DECISION MAKING (MCDM) USING 
ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP)  
Decision making amid complexity requires planners to consider many alternatives 
with many interrelated factors. Planners’ chosen course of action should have measurable 
characteristics and verifiable reasons for selection. MCDM is a scientific decision tool 
that can incorporate multiple alternatives and criteria.138 
One type of MCDM is the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). AHP breaks 
problems down into subsets of small problems and allows qualitative data or a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative data for analysis. AHP includes a predetermined ranking 
scale from 1 to 9 that facilitates weighting and pairwise comparison of alternatives and 
criteria.139 The process consists of two basic steps. First, it determines the ranking of the 
decision criteria by assigning weight (1-9) to their perceived value. Second, it determines 
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the relative ranking of the alternatives in comparison to the weighted criteria. The model 
numerically and graphically provides a prioritized objective ranking of the alternatives, 
modeling the nearest distance from the ideal solution. Finally, the decision maker can 
choose to either accept the ranking of the actions and their alternatives or revise the 
model to better reflect emerging considerations. Overall, the process structures problems, 
prioritizes alternatives, and facilitates group decision making when a consensus is 
difficult or impossible to achieve.140 The model’s versatility equips planners with the 
knowledge of what may happen when underlying criteria change. In other words, AHP 
helps to answer the questions, “Which one do we choose?” or “Which one is best?” when 
underlying conditions in the environment change.141 
D. OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN A MEGACITY  
Building on these conceptual models and the different approaches they provide 
for problem solving, this section proposes the Urban Intervention Model (UIM) to aid 
planners facing possible military interventions in megacities. It is a four-step model 
developed to mirror CBR and provide a process model aimed at generating real-time 
actionable information for planning and executing operations in a megacity. The UIM 
Step 1 combines the JOPP steps of mission analysis with course of action development, 
analysis and comparison. The JOPP steps produce MOEs, MOPs and objectives 
prescriptively while the UIM produces equivalent outputs non-prescriptively that mirrors 
CBR and ELM. UIM Step 2 mirrors order development within JOPP, and Steps 3 and 4 
complete the framework by covering execution of operations and providing for the 
continual re-evaluation of mission success. See Figure 2. Overall, the UIM is rapid and 
more decentralized than the JOPP steps. 
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Figure 2.  Where the Urban Intervention Model (UIM) Fits with the Joint 
Operation Planning Process (JOPP) 
Step 1, Assess Urban Environment and Relationships, consists of four sub steps 
that illuminate key factors and their relationships to one another in the operational 
environment. The sub steps are as follows: 1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems, 1.2 State 
Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes, 1.3 Develop Potential Appropriate 
Interventions, and 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions. Step 1 provides a 
snapshot of the environment, and the planner relies upon past operational experiences to 
identify which considerations are immediately relevant to the crisis at hand. Past 
experience will not perfectly inform the most appropriate actions the planner should take, 
but it is the best position to begin planning potential actions. The planner must divorce 
traditional planning paradigms from his own operational experiences to inform this step. 
For this reason, past operational experiences provide a template for success or failure to 
inform intervention-specific decisions to act or not to act. The diversity of staffs’ 
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operational experiences, in conjunction with the application of the UIM, combines 
multiple perspectives to create more resilient solutions against megacity-specific 
challenges than operational experiences alone. This is the planner’s “context,” that allows 
him to map previously successful solutions to the current environmental picture through 
CBR and then to make a decision. In this way, the UIM prevents the prescriptive 
reduction of the environment offered by traditional planning models. Traditional planning 
models force the staff to concentrate on just a few variables such as infrastructure and the 
control of space. A rigid planning process fails to incorporate all available information. 
The UIM offers a flexible model to incorporate all available information. 
Step 1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems, identifies key problems related to the 
crisis and generates a simple problem statement. A key problem could be a combination 
of several contributing problems. For instance, when an airport or seaport has been 
damaged or destroyed the key problem identified is “infrastructure,” and the problem 
statement might read, “Seaport is damaged and inoperable; no alternate seaports exist 
within a 100-mile radius of city. No cargo is incoming or outgoing.” By the end of this 
step, planners should identify all knowable key problems relative to the planner’s 
knowledge, experience, and access to information. The problems and statements that 
planners generate should be deliberately scoped to include both problems the planner 
expects to address and also take all efforts to consider problems that they do not expect to 
address by thinking far beyond the immediate problem and by considering how systems 
are related to and affect one another.  
At the end of Step 1.1, planners prioritize problems to allow focused development 
in subsequent steps. They determine which problems and how many problems are the 
most relevant to the crisis at hand. When the number of alternatives and the number of 
criteria are many, consensus decision making may be difficult, if not unattainable. When 
consensus is unattainable, planners should use decision tools such as AHP to rapidly 
reach solutions that account for multiple perspectives. Chapter IV will further elaborate 
on this point. 
Step 1.2, State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes. This sub-step generates 
the desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes for every key problem and problem statement. 
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Building upon the above mentioned example, “Seaport is secured, Seaport is repaired, 
Temporary seaport is established in the vicinity of the damaged port, Flows of sea cargo 
are able to come into city, etc.,” are all impacts, outputs or outcomes. This step directly 
addresses the problems from Step 1.1 and develops desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes 
based upon the planner’s knowledge, experience, and access to information.  
Step 1.3, Develop Potential and Appropriate Interventions. This step identifies 
possible intervention types that appropriately address each problem statement and 
considers the desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes generated in the previous step. For 
instance, planners could consider the following intervention actions for the problem 
statement in Step 1.1: “Intervention 1- Provide assessment team to damaged seaport, 
Intervention 2- International partner provides material support to seaport, Intervention 3- 
Carrier Strike Group provides logistical and security support to seaport until port is 
repaired.” Once planners identify the intervention actions, they conceptually expand each 
intervention by answering the following: conceptualize where not to do, conceptualize 
where to do, conceptualize with whom not to do, conceptualize with whom to do, 
conceptualize what not to do, conceptualize what to do, conceptualize when not to do, 
conceptualize when to do[action]. This process defines the relationships of action, actor, 
location, and time necessary within the intervention for mission success. 
Step 1.4, Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions. Planners conceptualize the 
potential effects that should or should not be created for each intervention type previously 
identified. Continuing with the seaport example, possible effects include: “Should arrive 
at seaport as soon as possible, by any means available, to restore the flow of cargo; 
should liaise with local dock workers and supervisors to gain local knowledge; should not 
impede the flow of cargo into city; should not increase risk to ships transporting cargo, 
etc..”  
After completing the four sub-steps in Step 1, the planner has identified key 
problems, prioritized them, stated desired impacts, outputs or outcomes, developed 
potential interventions, and identified the effects that should and should not be created 
through intervention. Steps 1.1 through 1.4 are an iterative process where planners use 
experience and consider it against historically relevant criteria to achieve the desired 
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outcome. The first iteration identifies whether or not past solutions are appropriate for 
current circumstances and prompts a rapid decision by the operator. The planners 
reevaluate and refine context by considering the reprioritization of criteria, to reach a 
more optimal solution. Running through the urban intervention model as a “thought 
experiment” can rapidly model or “war game” potential solutions until the decision 
maker decides to commit to a way forward.  
Step 1 should also focus on the application of megacity specific knowledge, 
presented in Chapter Two, to inform necessary criteria and actions. For instance, it may 
be useful to know how political power diffuses throughout the city, where the governance 
gaps exist, or where force ratios are insufficient. Planners combine military experience 
and training to develop a better picture of the environment by following each of the four 
sub steps. 
Step 2, Decide and Assign Forces. This step requires the planner to make a 
preliminary decision to intervene or not and then to assign the most appropriate forces 
based upon the desired effects. The JOPP equivalent step is “course of action approval 
and order development.” The AHP decision tool analyzes qualitative and or quantitative 
data associated with intervention types, generated in Step 1. This process informs 
decisions to intervene or not, and decisions of which kinds of forces to commit.142 
Military commanders and planners should consider the right combination of boots on the 
ground (military), shoes on the ground (civilian), and remote activities performed via 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), cyber action, and so on.143 The 
decision tool provides a ranked order of best alternatives according to planner-generated 
criteria. In turn, the ranked order provides a mathematical vetting of the perceived best 
course of action or right force for the effects needed. As such, planners view rankings as 
a planning consideration and not an authoritative direction. This tool helps facilitate 
group consensus when the complexity of the problem obscures simple decision making. 
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This step produces a decision to intervene or not and chooses the force composition in the 
event of an intervention.  
Step 3, Intervene. This step introduces external forces to the megacity according 
to the intervention decided upon in Step 2. The impetus of this step centers upon the 
achievement of desired effects and the prevention of undesired effects. For instance, 
successful intervention actions result in prevented terror attacks. Intervening forces need 
to visualize their actions in terms of effects prior to taking action in the megacity. To do 
this, planners can war game to contemplate or conceptually simulate actions by running 
them through Steps 1.1 to 1.4. The continual re-visitation of these steps embodies the 
principles of the experiential learning model. Additionally, timely feedback from 
intervening forces within the city remains crucial to updating the common operating 
picture of the entire city.  
For experiential learning to have an effect, planning and execution should be 
decentralized. This approach in turn helps foster adaptability, which allows intervening 
forces to cope with emergent situations at all levels of conflict. As such, every unit 
should have some level of visibility with other elements to incorporate or avoid similar 
actions. It remains incumbent upon the Task Force, or other higher headquarters, to 
determine the desired overarching effects, objectives, and end states of the intervention 
into a megacity. They should also facilitate the common operating picture for the entire 
city to include successful and unsuccessful attempts to achieve desired effects and the 
overall mission. 
Step 4, Evaluate. This step determines whether conditions assessed in Step 1 have 
changed or not. If conditions have changed then the planner should return to Step 1.1 and 
update changes to Steps 1.1 to 1.4. Once operations achieve the desired end state, 
planners give careful consideration to the cessation of intervention activities. Any 
changes will have effects, and the planners must equally consider these effects during 
retrograde as during deployment. Removing forces from the battlefield will have an 
impact or effect upon conditions in the city. The UIM can illuminate courses of action for 
retrograde by considering who, what, when, and where actions need to continue after 
external forces have left. The Urban Intervention Model is summarized below. 
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Urban Intervention Model 
Step 1 - Assess Urban Environment and Relationships 
1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems 
1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes 
1.3 Develop Potential Appropriate Interventions 
1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
Step 2 – Decide and Assign Forces 
Step 3 – Intervene 
Step 4 – Evaluate 
E. CONCLUSION 
The UIM can assist the integration of planning efforts at any level if a crisis 
necessitates a rapid assessment, operations require decentralized decision making and 
action, and the environment is complex. These points are especially true when the 
megacity is in crisis and has rapidly changing dynamics. The proposed UIM incorporates 
case-based reasoning into planning to allow forces to remain adaptable in the face of 
rapidly changing environments, and to make forces aware of how their actions can 
generate effects in the environment. The model is flexible enough to incorporate any kind 
of sensory input, and ground forces can easily gather information and use Step 1 to 
conceptually understand their actions in light of new conditions once deployed. 
Moreover, planners can collect diverse perspectives from across the battlespace to 
disseminate successful or unsuccessful actions and effects. Within this approach, the 
UIM incorporates AHP to prioritize problems or courses of action. Finally, planning 
staffs can use the UIM as a training platform to improve their ability to make rapid and 
accurate decisions through experiential learning model and coordinate actions and effects 
in complex environments like megacities.  
Chapter IV will use the UIM to analyze Cairene, a fictitious megacity hit by a 
major earthquake, and generate a TSOC’s hypothetical response to this disaster. 
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IV. URBAN INTERVENTION MODEL APPLIED
Chapter III argued that current military planning lacks the ability to fully account 
for the complexity of megacities and introduced case-based reasoning, the Experiential 
Learning Model, and the Analytical Hierarchy Process as means to address the 
complexities of megacities. Applied together, these concepts and models form the four-
step Urban Intervention Model (UIM), a potential solution to doctrinal gaps that would 
enhance military intervention planning for megacities. Chapter III then proposed that the 
UIM can assist with the integration of planning efforts at any level where the 
environment is complex, a crisis necessitates a rapid assessment, or operations require 
decentralized decision making and action. 
This chapter applies the UIM to a fictional scenario, a major earthquake in the 
megacity of Cairene, that shows many of the characteristics and complexities that exist in 
most megacities today. The chapter first focuses on applying UIM Steps 1.1 through 1.4, 
then demonstrates important considerations for Steps 2 through 4. Following the 
application and consideration of the specific UIM steps, Chapter IV goes on to discuss 
the benefits, challenges, outputs, and outcomes that result from the UIM application in a 
megacity. The chapter then concludes by showing how the UIM can serve as the 
foundation for understanding complexity in any environment. 
A. THE MEGACITY – CAIRENE 
Cairene, a megacity, is home to 18 million people. Cairene stretches over 214km² 
with a population density of 10,500 people per km². Containing 50% of the country’s 
population and contributing 80% of the country’s GDP, Cairene is the political, cultural, 
religious, and economic center of the country. Consequently, Cairene´s city government 
exerts great regional and international influence. The country’s major river, the lifeline of 
the city, provides the primary water source of drinking water to the city and connects 
Cairene with the ocean. The city´s seaport transfers the majority of Cairene’s food, 
commercial, and raw material supplies from cargo ships via rail transport into the city. 
Cairene International Airport, the city’s only airport, is located ten kilometers northeast 
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of Cairene and consists of three runways and four passenger terminals. It is the region’s 
second busiest airport and is essential to the regional flow of goods and people. 
Cairene consists of four official administrative divisions: the government, the 
commercial, industrial, and residential districts. The government district is the national 
and city seat for all government institutions. The separation between municipal and 
national government is almost indistinguishable, and corruption and nepotism is the 
norm. The commercial district features grocery markets, retail outlets, and restaurants 
that provide all manner of goods and services to both residents and tourists. The 
industrial district, home to the city’s airport, seaport, and power plant, is also where 
large-scale manufacturing produces the majority of the city’s goods for both internal and 
external markets.  
The city´s population lives in the residential district, subdivided into three distinct 
boroughs, the upper class (9% of population), the lower to upper middle class (53% of 
population), and the slums (38% of population). Cairene’s poorest residents live in the 
slums, a series of unofficial settlements spread along the periphery of the industrial 
district. The city center, where the government and commercial districts meet, is the 
political and cultural heart of the city, also known as “Little Dubaike.” The middle and 
upper class residential districts immediately surround the city center. The industrial 
district and the slums are scattered around the periphery of the middle and upper class 
boroughs. The majority of the city, with the exception of the slums, has full access to 
water, electricity, sewage, trash removal, and other government services. The municipal 
government does not attempt to provide services to the slums, stating that they are not 
officially recognized housing settlements. 
All of Cairene experiences heavy traffic congestion due to insufficient 
infrastructure, insufficient capital investments, insufficient public transportation systems, 
technical incompetence, corruption, excessive individual use of motorized transportation, 
and the overall volume of transportation. Daily traffic jams bring the city to a standstill 
for several hours, paralyzing traffic flow in the city. Cairene relies heavily upon rail to 
transport goods to and from the seaports; however, the rails do little to ease the traffic 
congestion within the city. Due to a shortfall in rail cars and frequently inoperable, aging 
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locomotives, trucks end up carrying over 70% of all cargo between the industrial district 
and the end user. With trucks as the primary means of distribution within the city, in 
addition to traffic slogs, auto emissions create a smog-clad environment, heavily 
affecting the respiratory health of all city dwellers. 
Cairene’s emergency services – police, fire, and ambulances – operate throughout 
the city, but not in the slums. Although known for internal corruption, the police are a 
professional force that maintains security and rule of law. The police allow criminal 
elements in the slums to operate with impunity so long as conflicts within the slums do 
not affect areas outside the slums. 
Fire and ambulance personnel have medical training to provide basic first aid until 
patients reach one of the city’s four major hospitals, all located in the city center. 
However, severe traffic congestion throughout the city greatly hampers the response time 
to emergencies. As a result, the injured and sick do not rely on ambulances, but instead 
they rely upon themselves or family members to reach the hospitals. Most middle class 
residents, especially with lower incomes, prefer to avoid the hospital altogether and 
instead visit the smaller free health clinics spread throughout the city. These clinics 
provide little more than basic family care and have almost no trauma capability. Although 
these clinics are free, patrons must prove legal residence by providing an address and a 
city issued identification card. These clinics often deny healthcare to those living in slums 
because they cannot prove official residency. The upper class relies upon private health 
care providers who charge a premium for their services.  
The slums pose a growing concern for Cairene. Nearly 40% of the city’s 
population lives in slums with low or no income at all. Due to rapid influx of immigrants 
from the region’s poorest countries, coupled with the country’s rural poor migrating to 
the city in search of work, Cairene’s population has grown 50% over the last ten years. 
These immigrants build temporary dilapidated housing adjacent to existing indigenous 
slums. Now, immigrant and indigenous slums comprise one contiguous ungoverned zone. 
Slum dwellers compete among each other for both housing and jobs, leading to 
increasing tensions and sporadic violence with no police protection. As a result, criminal 
elements emerged from both the indigenous and immigrant populations to provide 
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limited security and exploit existing black markets for water, electricity, and fuel within 
the slums. 
B. NATURE OF CRISIS – EARTHQUAKE 9.0 
At 0200 on 1 June, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hits Cairene. Instantly, more than 
100,000 die and another 1.2 million residents are severely injured. Because the crisis 
occurs at night, most die or suffer injuries in their homes. The higher quality construction 
of the middle and upper class boroughs withstands most of the devastation; at the same 
time, much of the multi-story slum housing collapses, emergency responders concentrate 
their effort on the middle and upper class boroughs, despite the fact that 70% of all 
casualties are in the slums. 
The earthquake also severely degrades critical infrastructure including the city´s 
airport, seaport, and power plant, threatening millions more lives and hampering relief 
efforts. The airport´s runway itself remains functional, but the earthquake destroys the 
airport control tower, eliminating all possibilities of air traffic. The seaport suffers severe 
losses, including the destruction of several wharfs and adjacent storage facilities. The 
earthquake causes minimal damage to the power plant, but the earthquake disrupts the 
distribution network at countless locations preventing the distribution the flow of 
electricity. Transportation networks are impassable due to debris covered roads and 
severely bent railway tracks, preventing the effective distribution of food, water, and 
medical supplies from the ports into the city while also slowing the efforts to restore the 
electric grid. 
There are no immediate security threats as survivors are working to secure their 
possessions or rescue/recover family from the rubble. Still, if the municipal government 
does not meet the demand for food, water, electricity, and medical assistance, the security 
condition will rapidly worsen, creating a hostile environment. The city government 
expects the slum dwellers to take the advantage of the situation, including looting parts of 
the destroyed city for copper and other valuables. The delicate security situation might 
entice criminal networks to emerge from the slums in response to the needs of the people 
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and take advantage of the city government’s lack of capacity to expand their influence 
through coercion and robbery. 
By 0400, two hours after the earthquake, city crews have mounted a hasty 
emergency response in the middle and upper class boroughs, recovering survivors and 
transporting victims to the hospital. However, the four city hospitals are over capacity, 
and it is evident that, unless international aid organizations augment the medical staff, 
victims may perish before ever seeing a doctor. The smaller health clinics and private 
doctor offices are also full and turning patients away. Furthermore, there are no 
municipal emergency response assets to dedicate to the slums. By 1400, city officials still 
do not have an accurate estimate of the damage or casualties within the slums. 
By 2300, the city government manages to get the power plant online, but downed 
power lines and electrical cables still prevent whole sections of the city from receiving 
electricity. More significantly, blocked roadways continue to prevent the flow of traffic to 
and from the industrial center, and the seaport and airport remain inoperable. Anticipating 
the need for foreign aid, and in an attempt improve the distribution of food, water, and 
medical supplies, city road crews are opening one route from the industrial district to the 
city center and between all four hospitals. However, throughput along this roadway is 
insufficient, and drivers have to stockpile cargo in makeshift holding yards. It is clear that 
Cairene cannot handle this disaster on its own, but in order for the international 
community to assist Cairene, the airport and roadways must be open. 
Within the first 24 hours after the earthquake, the World Health Organization, the 
European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), and a host of international coalition partners pledge immediate 
support, but they need the assistance of U.S. government operational and logistics 
support to facilitate the flow of food, water, medical supplies, personnel for rescue and 
recovery support, as well as general humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of the Cairene 
population. Specifically, the military must first open the airport to receive, store, and 
distribute aid. 
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C. CAIRENE CASE 
The Cairene case scopes the application of the UIM from a single staff section 
perspective in the first iteration and then incorporates greater megacity complexity in the 
second iteration. One chapter cannot fully address the complexity of a megacity crisis. 
However, applying the UIM to Cairene demonstrates basic capabilities with room for 
further development and testing. The Cairene case examines Steps 1.1 through 1.4 in 
detail through the eyes of the TSOC J3 (Director of Operations and Planning) and 
demonstrates Steps 2 through 4. Additionally, Appendix B contains further 
considerations for applying the UIM to the Cairene case. 
D. BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE TSOC J3  
The TSOC J3 staff uses the UIM to plan the military intervention in Cairene in 
the immediate hours following the earthquake. First, the TSOC commander directs the J3 
to support the international community’s relief efforts to provide aid in the first 72 hours 
after the disaster and until the Department of State can take over operational control of all 
relief efforts. The transportation/distribution network is the COG because its degraded 
state directly hinders the mission by preventing the flow of aid. The European Union 
(EU) has offered naval assistance on behalf of Germany, France, and Great Britain to 
help open the seaport nearest to Cairene. This relieves the U.S. military of most maritime 
obligations for the intervention, but the seaports will not be operational until 17 June.  
Therefore, overland and aerial transportation are the only viable options for 
immediate intervention. While the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has contracted crews travelling overland towards Cairene to assist with road 
clearing, the destruction at the airfield remains unaddressed. The United Nations has 
dedicated staff from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) who are prepared to facilitate the distribution of food and medical 
aid once the Cairene International Airport is operational. The J3 must recommend the 
number and type of forces for intervention to the TSOC Commander for approval. The J3 
must conduct hasty planning, so the TSOC can rapidly disseminate information and 
coordinate amongst interagency and host nation partners. 
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First, the TSOC J3 issues the following planning priorities to the TSOC staff: 
The desired end state is the restoration of Cairene’s ability to receive and 
distribute aid from the international community. Any disruption of timely 
aid delivery or interrupted government services will likely result in local 
and then possibly regional security instability. Within the next 72 hours, 
the staff should immediately focus on opening the flow of aid into 
Cairene. Once aid is flowing into Cairene, shift planning priorities to assist 
local security forces with stabilization. The TSOC will continue to support 
the U.S. Department of State once they are in the lead. 
The airfield is the most important decisive point in the transportation/distribution network 
because opening it will facilitate the reception of relief efforts, directly contributing to the 
achievement of the end state. Additionally, without the airfield as a viable ingress route 
for security assistance forces, the TSOC cannot assist the local government in 
stabilization. Therefore, the TSOC J3 Air (Director of Air Operations) is the main effort 
for surging initial support to Cairene. 
E. UIM APPLICATION: FIRST ITERATION – STEP 1 
Step 1 illuminates key objects and relationships in the operational environment, 
which provides context for further decision-making in Step 2, Decide and Assign Forces. 
Step 1 provides a snapshot of the relevant factors in the environment, and the planner 
relies upon UIM reasoning and the commander’s guidance to identify which 
considerations are immediately relevant. The J3 staff brainstorms potential measures of 
performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in Steps 1.3 and 1.4, 
respectively. The TSOC staff sections each use the UIM, completing Step 1, and deliver 
their planning estimates to the J3. See Appendix B for complete Cairene case. The 
following is the J3 Air’s planning estimate: 
Step 1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems 
• Infrastructure: The earthquake damaged the air traffic
control system, rendering it inoperable. No emergency air 
traffic control capability exists at Cairene International 
Airport. There are no incoming or outgoing aircraft. 
Blocked roadways prevent the flow of aid and resources 
from Cairene International Airport into the city. 
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The information in Step 1 becomes the staff’s key planning 
problem because it identifies and prioritizes for the influx of aid. 
Opening the airport becomes the first planning priority, and the J3 must 
subsequently address all other key problems.  
Step 1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes 
First key problem: Infrastructure – The earthquake damaged the air 
traffic control system, rendering it inoperable. No emergency air 
traffic control capability exists at Cairene International Airport. 
• Establish emergency air traffic control
• Reestablish local air traffic control capability
• Secure airport
• Open flow of aid to airport
• 
Step 1.3 Develop Potential and Appropriate Intervention Actions 
The potential actions listed in Step 1.3 are MOPs used to assess 
whether the TSOC is performing its tasks correctly, while the 
determination of effects that the intervention should and should not 
create, found in Step 1.4, serve as MOEs. 
• Action 1: TSOC facilitates local air traffic controllers to
resume operations 
• Action 2: International partner provides emergency air
traffic control
• Action 3: Special Tactics Teams (STT) provide emergency
air traffic control
• Action 4: Force Contingency Response Group (CRG)
provides emergency air traffic control
• Action 5: Combat Communications Group (CCG) provides
air traffic control systems (tower, TACAN, radar, et cetera)
A. The planner conceptualizes the details of every intervention action 
type above. While Appendix B contains examples for all action 
types, the details of Action 1 are shown below: 
Action 1: Special Tactics Teams (STT) provide emergency air 
traffic control: 
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• Where not to do action: non-standard runways (dirt, and or 
makeshift airfields) 
• Where to do action: Cairene International Airport (confirm 
length of runways, identify aid storage areas; confirm 
noncombatant evacuation routes and staging areas) 
• With whom not to do action: unaffiliated third party 
personnel to Cairene International Airport. (personnel not 
employed or authorized to conduct operations at the 
airport) 
• With whom to do action: technically experienced local 
nationals including: air traffic controllers; airport security 
personnel; technical avionics contractors; personnel whose 
association gives decisive access to a vital areas or objects; 
combined military and civilian personnel  
• What not to do: permanently replace local air traffic 
controllers; introduce large numbers of external forces 
• What to do: temporarily provide air traffic control 
assistance; assist with reestablishment of the local air traffic 
control capability; possible; ensure insertion method is 
appropriate for destination 
• When not to do action: an alternative with better 
capabilities becomes available; Cairene no longer needs aid  
• When to do action: provide emergency air traffic control 
assistance within 24 hours; upon receipt of request for 
assistance from Cairene 
 
Step 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
 Action 1: Special Tactics Teams (STT) provide emergency air 
traffic control: 
• Effects that should not be created: do not want to exclude 
local air traffic controllers from operations, even if they 
cannot use their equipment; do not allow local air traffic 
controllers to resume full control of operations until they 
are able to safely direct air traffic 
• Effects that should be created: the international community 
and foreign militaries support Cairene´s population; should 
consult with local air traffic controllers to gain their 
knowledge for operations specific to Cairene; should 
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identify and facilitate the equipment, expertise, and 
capabilities air traffic controllers need to reestablish local 
control of operations 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene must rely upon its 
own resources to provide aid to the population until it is 
able to open the airport; international community does not 
supply aid or provide military forces; food and medical 
shortages increase rapidly in Cairene and competition over 
these scarce resources creates conflict in Cairene 
• Effects of taking this action: demonstrates the international 
community’s and foreign militaries support to Cairene’s 
population; immediate air traffic control operations allow a 
greater amount of aid to flow into Cairene within 24 hours, 
thus reducing human suffering; Cairene receives a 
sufficient amount of aid to meet the peoples’ demands; 
competition for aid will decrease in Cairene – this may 
prevent escalating conflict within Cairene U.S. military 
assistance addresses moral and bi-lateral obligations to the 
affected people in Cairene; immediate air traffic control 
operations that open the flow of aid could avoid the spread 
of regional instability and supports U.S. national interest; 
the STT maintains a small footprint at the airport creating 
the impression that the U.S. military presence is not 
interfering in the country’s affairs; there will also be lower 
costs in manpower and resources for related security and 
sustainment operations of forces on the ground 
Note: All identified intervention actions are repeated in the above manner. See 
Appendix B for Action 1 through Action 5. 
 
The J3 chooses from proposed actions created in Step 1 to inform decision 
making in Step 2.  
F. UIM APPLICATION: FIRST ITERATION – STEP 2  
Step 2 gives careful consideration to the overall strategy to determine whether or 
not an intervention should occur. Step 1.3 listed several actions that the planner must now 
choose from, prioritize, and then assign appropriate MOPs and MOEs. MOPs measure a 
desired actions completion. For example, if the J3 chooses Action 1: TSOC facilitates 
local air traffic controllers to resume operations, then the completion of local air traffic 
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controllers resuming operations is the basis for measuring performance. Upon completion 
of the task, MOEs help the J3 to determine an action’s effectiveness. MOEs are the list of 
desired effects outlined in Step 1.4. If, for instance, the J3 finds that immediate air traffic 
control operations do not allow a greater amount of aid to flow into Cairene, then the J3 
can conclude that completing Action 1, while appropriately executed, failed to generate 
the desired effect. Monitoring effects helps the J3 to know when to adjust the plan. 
However, in addition to determining which actions in Step 1.3 to take, the J3 must also 
choose which forces are best suited to the task. The impetus for these considerations 
should be to leverage existing local personnel, equipment, and resources to accomplish 
the mission in the shortest time and with the fewest amount of external resources. 
Step 2 shows the application of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), a multi-
attribute decision making tool, to process the consideration of multiple intervention types 
and criteria when no alternative solution is clear.144 In this case, the J3 must choose 
between multiple units with similar capabilities and competencies. The AHP decision 
support tool can also be applied to any step in the UIM. Furthermore, the AHP allows a 
sensitivity analysis function to further analyze results. The sensitivity analysis shows the 
flexibility and robustness of courses of action when the priorities of criteria change, or 
when environmental dynamics force the implementation or removal of criteria.145 
The J3 staff identifies eight criteria it finds most important to the strategic and 
tactical missions for the intervention based upon the national strategic planning guidance 
and the GCC commander’s planning guidance. The J3 exercises judgement and ranks the 
criteria in the following order to assess potential intervention actions: Moral Obligation, 
Capacity of Flow, Rapid Deployment and Flexibility, Building Capacity, Risk to Own 
Troops, Regional Stability, Obligation versus Cost, Intervention Conflict. The J3 staff 
assigns weights to each of these criteria within the AHP tool. The staff then conducts a 
pairwise comparison of each criterion against all of the other seven criteria to determine 
                                                
144.  William P. Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making & Mathematical Modeling for Decision 
Making, AHP and TOPSIS, DA 4410” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 
2015), 1-10; Saaty, T. (1990). An exposition of the AHP in reply to the paper Remarks on the analytical 
hierarchy process by JS Dyer. Management Science, 36(3), 259–268. 
145.  Anderson et al., “Vector Relational Data Modeling.” 
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their prioritized ranking.146 See Appendix B for criteria definitions and the pairwise 
comparison of the criterion. The following criterion in Table 5 are ranked by the 
eigenvector value from highest to lowest values: 
Table 5.   Intervention Criteria Weighting and Eigenvector Values  
Criterion  Value Ranking 
Moral Obligation  0.30 1 
Capacity of Flow 0.28 2 
Rapid Deployment and Flexibility 0.15 3 
Building Capacity 0.10 4 
Risk to Own Troops 0.07 5 
Regional Stability 0.05 6 
Obligation versus Cost 0.03 7 
Intervention Conflict 0.03 8 
 
The Moral Obligation criterion has the highest eigenvector value of 0.30, and it is 
immediately followed by the Capacity of Flow criterion with a value of 0.28 and the 
Rapid Deployment and Flexibility criterion with a value of 0.15. This simply means these 
criteria are weighted more heavily than the other criteria for decision-making. 
In a next step, the J3 staff weighs each of intervention actions, from Step 1.3, 
against each of the eight weighted criteria above, by conducting a second pairwise 
comparison.147 See Appendix B for the pairwise comparison. 
Table 6.   Intervention Actions Eigenvector Values 
Alternatives - Intervention Actions Eigenvector Value Ranking 
CRG and CCG - Contingency Response Group (CRG) and Combat 
Communications Groups (CCG) 0.37 1 
STT– Special Tactics Teams 0.28 2 
Advise Host Nation – not responsible for air traffic control operations 0.14 3 
Air Drops – deliver aid without ground presence  0.13 4 
No Support  0.07 5 
 
                                                
146.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
147.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
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As seen in Table 6, the CRG and CCG action receives the highest value of 0.37, 
and the STT closely follows with a value of 0.28. Both of these actions best addressed the 
eight criteria previously developed.  
Finally, the J3 conducts a sensitivity analysis to consider the resilience of all 
alternative actions of underlying conditions that affect criteria change.148 Based upon the 
consideration of all eight criteria developed and weighted by the staff, the sensitivity 
analysis results show that the CRG and CCG and the STT actions are the best suited 
choices given the immediate demand to open the airport. The CRG and CCG value of 
0.37 and the STT value of 0.28 mean both intervention actions are resilient to change if 
the criteria change. In other words, if the weighting of criteria changes in time, the 
intervention types will still remain appropriate options. See Appendix B for detailed 
sensitivity analysis results. 
The J3 assesses that the sensitivity analysis conducted in the AHP supports any 
combination of CRG and CCG or STT. The intervention actions with the highest values 
demonstrate which actions better address the eight criteria overall. These two 
combinations are much closer to the ideal solution than Advise Host Nation, Air Drops, or 
No Support. If any criterion changes, or if a new criterion is added, then the planners 
must recalculate the AHP and sensitivity analysis. The staff briefs the TSOC Commander 
and recommends introducing the STT because the CRG and CCG cannot deploy within 
76 hours, while the STT can deploy within 24 hours. Therefore, the Commander decides 
to deploy the STT to open Cairene´s airport. 
G. UIM APPLICATION: FIRST ITERATION – STEP 3 
Step 3, Intervene, should incorporate the concepts of what, where, with whom, 
and when to take action for interventions. Once military forces are in the megacity, they 
confirm or deny the conceptualized intervention actions planned through assessments and 
interactions. The forces also validate assigned MOPs and MOEs, the actions and effects 
148.  William P. Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making & Mathematical Modeling for Decision 
Making, AHP and TOPSIS, DA 4410” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 
2015), 1-10; Saaty, T., “An exposition of the AHP in reply to the paper remarks on the analytical hierarchy 
process by JS Dyer,” Management Science, 36,  no. 3, 1990: 259–268. 
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developed in Steps 1.3 and Step 1.4, respectively. Feedback from ground forces to the 
TSOC drives updates to the common operating picture. 
H. UIM APPLICATION: FIRST ITERATION – STEP 4 
Step 4, Evaluate, is the point when the staff analyzes the feedback provided 
through MOPs and MOEs to determine whether the intervention actively achieves the 
desired end state. In the case of Cairene, the STT reopened the airfield and prepared to 
transition control back to the host nation. However, locals reported increased incidents of 
theft, bribery, and coercion. Furthermore, NGOs reported that armed gangs had extorted 
their drivers and prohibited aid delivery. 
Interventions that fail to yield a desired result could indicate a shift in the COG. 
Reevaluation refines context and allows the planner to reprioritize criteria creating a 
better solution. The UIM as a “thought experiment” can rapidly model or “war game” 
potential solutions until the decision maker decides to refine or develop a new course of 
action. For Cairene, the TSOC evaluated the actions of the STT as effective. Specifically, 
the STT entered Cairene International Airport within 24 hours and provided emergency 
air traffic control for all incoming and outgoing aircraft meeting MOPs from Step 1.3. 
Also, the following MOEs were met from Step 1.4: within 36 hours after the earthquake, 
the STT was able to locate sixty percent of the local national air traffic controllers and 
began reestablishing local systems in order to resume operations at the airport; host 
nation contractors began repairing control tower equipment; the Cairene government 
ordered equipment repairs, and the STT estimates that it may be able to hand over 
complete operations to local nationals within thirty days. While the intervention actions 
listed above met MOEs and MOPs from Step 1.3 and Step 1.4, the nature of the problem 
on the ground changed, and the J3 must consider these new conditions and reevaluate its 
plan. 
I. UIM APPLICATION: SECOND ITERATION – STEP 1 
The J3 will reevaluate conditions in Cairene and decide to reinitiate the UIM in 
the wider context of preventing local and regional security destabilization. Appendix B 
contains the complete process. Local criminal elements operating out of the slums are 
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exploiting increased gaps in governance and rule of law. The most prominent criminal 
element greatly influences the Opposition Party, a minority political party representing 
the slums. TSOC analysts expect the Opposition Party to take advantage of the current 
instability to increase its power. According to local police reports, an unknown group 
murdered members of the city’s Ruling Party near their homes. The murders appear to be 
well-organized hits rather than the work of amateur criminals. In addition, a combination 
of U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT), local human intelligence (HUMINT), and 
intelligence services have intercepted communications from the regional terrorist 
organization to criminal leaders offering them money in exchange for committing acts of 
terrorism. 
On 6 June, Department of State takes the lead in planning and organizing relief 
efforts while the TSOC focuses its resources against the emerging security threats. The 
TSOC J3 therefore issues the following revised planning guidance: 
Assist local and state security organizations in preventing the alliance of 
local criminal organizations with the regional terrorist organization. 
Exploit local knowledge and networks used by criminal organizations to 
entice them to assist Cairene officials in preventing terrorist or insurgent 
actions. When possible, disrupt, destroy, or neutralize the regional terrorist 
organization without implicating Western military forces or escalating 
conflicts. 
The growing security threats and the dramatically improved flow of aid and services 
constitute a change in the COG. Therefore, the J3 directs the staff to re-run Step 1 of the 
UIM. The J3 staff determines criminal elements are the most significant security threat to 
municipal instability, while the external terrorist organization could also foster wider 
regional instability or instigate insurgent activities.  
In Step 1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems, TSOC planners identify criminal 
interests in Cairene slums, Opposition Party grievances with Ruling Party members, 
political inequality, and growing regional terrorist influence as key problems. These 
problems are categorized under the PMESII-PT headings of Military, Social, and 
Government. The PMESSII-PT factors are Political, Military, Economic, Social, 
Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time. The J3 prioritizes 
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Government related grievances over Military and Social factors, since extending rule of 
law into the slums will contain the spread of criminal activity across the city and deny 
access to terrorist organizations.  
Step 1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes, leads to understanding the 
following: SOF cannot directly target the Opposition Party, yet the party’s role is central 
to security threats emerging in Cairene; criminal elements rely exclusively upon illicit 
activities to meet their financial interests. If the Cairene government can become more 
inclusive of the opposition and formalize their relationship with criminal elements’ 
leadership, then there could be an opportunity to reduce security threats. The desired 
outcome is to extend rule of law in the slums by co-opting and integrating local criminal 
leadership into formal governance and deny terrorist organizations access to the city. 
Step 1.3 Develop Potential and Appropriate Interventions reveals that it is neither 
feasible nor appropriate to introduce a large external force into Cairene. Anti-western and 
terrorist groups could exploit the presence of large foreign military forces through their 
rhetoric. United States SOF can, however, advise local security forces on reintegrating 
criminal elements within municipal security and governance roles in the existing slums. 
SOF can also facilitate the dialogue between police and former rivals within the criminal 
organizations. 
Step 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions considers the effects of 
each intervention action and determines that Western military presence should be kept as 
minimal and as discrete as possible. Higher-level political discussions with the 
Opposition Party and Ruling Party should remain within Department of State channels, 
while continued dialogue between local security officials and criminal leaders should 
continue. Joint U.S. and local HUMINT efforts should focus upon identifying Cairene 
sources of support of the regional terrorist organization. Further identification will allow 
lethal and non-lethal targeting by host nation and coalition forces. 
As SOF continue operations in Step 3 Intervene, each action is informed by the 
planning process to include with whom to act or not act, what action to take or not take, 
when to act or not act, and where to act or not act. As a result, rapid decision making, a 
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function of Step 2 Decide and Assign Forces, allows forces to counter widespread 
criminal activities, politically backed killings, and terrorist support actions. SOF further 
determine that continued low-level looting provides sufficient preoccupation and income 
to criminal organizations, therefore giving criminal elements less incentive to partner 
with the terrorist organization. As the dialogue between the criminal elements and the 
municipal government continues, several indigenous criminal leaders express interest in 
cooperating with the government while most immigrant criminal leaders refuse any 
communication. 
Upon evaluating intervention actions in Step 4 Evaluate, the J3 decides to foster 
ongoing SOF-sponsored reintegration dialogues between select criminal elements and 
Cairene police. Regional state partners have offered to provide a military response to the 
terrorist activity in Cairene. The collaborative approach will reduce Western military 
presence, but the TSOC will facilitate intelligence sharing between regional partners. The 
Department of State works with government officials to broker a deal to bring no charges 
against the Opposition Party if politically motivated killings stop. 
The J3 determines that the intervention actions have opened the flow of aid to 
Cairene and assisted local security forces in maintaining security and rule of law in 
Cairene. The TSOC provided leadership, planning, and resource assistance to the 
government to address human suffering and security concerns. The TSOC also 
determines that a small ‘advise and assist’ SOF presence is sufficient to maintain 
enduring support to Cairene’s civil administration. 
J. RESULTS 
Prescriptive planning models, like JOPP, fail to allow for decentralized and rapid 
responses to unforeseen developments in highly complex environments. For instance, in 
August 2003, after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. military forces failed to stop looting in the 
city, and the effects from the breakdown of rule of law created a host of subsequent 
problems for coalition and Iraqi forces. If U.S. forces had access to and applied the UIM, 
they might have weighed the negative impacts of looting against the greater stabilization 
efforts, and they may have been better empowered to take corrective action. The UIM 
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empowers troops on the ground to determine what actions should be taken and with a 
better understanding of the reasons behind those actions. The fundamental thinking 
driving the UIM is not based upon prescriptive orders; instead, priorities are developed 
based on what should or should not be done given the complexity and the corresponding 
effects. When situations emerge during operations that are similar to previously identified 
conceptualizations of what to do or not to do, leaders and planners have past 
considerations to guide them. The decision to act or not to act can be made more rapidly 
and in a decentralized fashion. 
K. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV began by describing Cairene, a fictional megacity faced with a highly 
complex situation following a massive earthquake. The TSOC J3 applied the UIM to 
assess the environment and its corresponding relationships by doing the following: 
identifying and prioritizing problems; stating desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes; 
developing potential appropriate interventions; and identifying the potential effects of 
interventions. The J3 then utilized assessment outputs to inform the decision on whether 
and how to intervene and applied a multi-criteria decision tool. Finally, the chapter 
described the results to show how the UIM might integrate with existing TSOC staff 
planning. 
Chapter IV demonstrated that the UIM is an appropriate tool for comprehensive 
planning and execution of military operations in megacities. Planners used the model to 
deliberately integrate feedback mechanisms, prioritize problems, state desired impacts 
and outcomes, and develop appropriate interventions while considering effects of 
interventions. Chapter Five will discuss and recommend implications for future research 





This thesis began by asserting that megacities are complex systems that are 
continuing to grow, particularly in developing regions. The complexity of megacities, 
especially in developing countries, poses a unique and challenging environment for 
governance and security. Megacities in developing nations struggle with the ability to 
build adequate infrastructure and meet their populations’ demands, including access to 
jobs, security, food, potable water, and education. Inadequate access to essential services 
increases the risk of disease on a grand scale.  
Large populations and urban density in megacities are problems not only for local 
governance, but also for intervening forces and other and their ability to meet the needs 
of urban populations in the event of natural or manmade disasters. The sheer number and 
density of people living in a megacity require greater security forces than are likely 
available. Megacities are a new operational environment where nations have yet to test 
traditional strategies on such a grand scale.  
Within this discussion on the proliferation of megacities, this thesis aimed to 
answer the following question: What do Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and 
Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) need to know about megacities, and how 
can they improve the planning process to more rapidly assess, synchronize, and guide 
military operations in megacities? 
Chapter II provided an overview of megacities, including offering a working 
definition of megacities, and the unique challenges of governance and resource 
management for megacities. Chapter II then used this discussion to inform security 
concerns for military intervention. It detailed military considerations that highlight 
western militaries’ unpreparedness to conduct operations in megacities. 
Chapter III began by describing useful planning and conceptual models for 
understanding megacities from a military perspective. These models included the 
experiential learning model (ELM), joint operation planning process (JOPP), and the 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP). From this discussion, the chapter presented the 
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Urban Intervention Model (UIM), a four-part model that incorporates elements of the 
models listed above while presenting a new framework for planning urban interventions. 
The chapter concluded with a detailed explanation of the UIM’s steps and sub-steps, and 
how they would be applied at the joint staff level.  
Chapter IV used the UIM to plan a TSOC-led intervention into a fictitious 
megacity—Cairene—following an earthquake. In this scenario, damage from the 
earthquake overwhelmed the Cairene government’s ability to treat casualties, repair 
damaged infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian aid. The U.S. government tasked the 
TSOC with restoring the Cairene government’s ability to receive and distribute aid 
provided by the international community. From this description, the chapter provided a 
demonstration of how to apply each of the UIM steps within the scenario. The chapter 
ended with a brief discussion of the wider application of the UIM and operational 
considerations for military planners. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) U.S and NATO forces should consider designating cities as a new 
operational domain. 
Historically, the United States and NATO only designated warfighting domains 
according to types of terrain (land, sea, air and space) with the aim of developing core 
competencies within the armed services.149 The United States military designated 
cyberspace as the fifth warfighting domain of warfighting and created Cyber Command 
in 2009 as the proponent tasked with the responsibility to develop and implement 
doctrinal and operational solutions relevant to the cyber environment.150 Establishing 
cyberspace as a distinct domain also acknowledged the need to dominate non-physical 
environments that span multiple forms of geography. More recently, the United States 
military has considered naming the human domain as the sixth realm of warfighting, 
acknowledging the centricity of human thought and action in warfare.  
                                                
149.  Peter Dombrowsk and Chris Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime 
Domain, “ Naval War College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 74. 
150.  Thomas Doherty, “Should There Be a Human Warfighting Domain?, “ Small Wars Journal 11, 
no. 12 (December 3, 2015): 1. 
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Much like the cyber domain, megacities, and urban centers in general, have 
significant physical and non-physical qualities that transcend geographic boundaries. 
However, as of 2016, urban warfare remains a subcomponent of the land warfare 
domain.151 Subordinating cities to such a broad geographically-defined domain may be 
an outdated approach to warfighting in a highly interconnected global environment. 
Rather than adapting current land warfare doctrine to urban terrain, making megacities an 
operational domain will allow for the development of more focused urban doctrine and 
strategy. This action will also ensure that a dedicated proponent remains focused on 
developing and procuring the specific tools for a military intervention in megacities. 
Finally, establishing cities as an operational domain will allow for the creation of urban 
warfare related military occupational specialties. 
(2) U.S. and NATO forces should develop inter-service, interagency, and 
international games and exercises that focus on multilateral intervention 
into megacities in the wake of natural or manmade disasters.  
The U.S. military’s chief doctrinal publication outlining Joint Operational 
Planning, JP 5–0, defines wargaming in the following way: “Wargaming is a conscious 
attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, 
adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the operational area, and other aspects of the 
operational environment.”152 
When used consistently, wargames can increase experience and decision-making 
skills.153 In the 2015 publication Analysis of U.S. Army Preparation for Megacity 
Operations, Colonel Patrick Kaune argues that wargaming megacity scenarios will, 
“allow the U.S. Army to generate efficiencies among the joint force and to validate 
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2011), xxvii. 
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concepts that shape and/or equip the force.”154 He also states that wargaming allows the 
U.S. Army to better shape its force structure for future megacity operations. Although the 
focus of Kaune’s study is the U.S. Army, he acknowledges that military interventions in a 
megacity are likely to be joint, combined, and inclusive of the interagency.155 Planners 
should therefore include the breath of potential partners in wargaming efforts in order to 
identify organizational differences and standardize response. 
In the summer of 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) is set to release the results of its two-year 
“Urbanisation Conceptual Study and Experiment.” This study included participants from 
across academia, industry, and the militaries of 17 NATO nations with the aim of 
projecting the strategic implications of urbanization by the year 2035.156 NATO ACT 
wargamed responses to three megacity scenarios: megacity social and political turmoil; a 
large-scale natural disaster; and the disruptive impact of rapid, mass migration. This 
experiment revealed organizational and doctrinal shortcoming within the NATO alliance. 
Examples include the following: the demand for real-time and dynamic, intelligence 
preparation of the environment (IPOE); better integration of communications platforms; 
and the need to integrate national urban warfare doctrines into a cohesive NATO 
document.157 Undoubtedly, NATO can improve its responsiveness and relevance by 
continuing such wargaming experiments that focus specifically on the unique operating 
environment of the megacity. 
In addition to wargaming, inter-service, interagency, and international exercises, 
such as Talisman Saber, put planning frameworks and intervention procedures for 
megacities into practice within a simulated environment. Talisman Saber is a biannual 
20-day Humanitarian Response and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) exercise held by the U.S. 
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Military and the Australian Defence Force.158 In 2015, this exercise included participants 
from Japan and New Zealand for the first time.159 Exercises such as Talisman Saber help 
identify capability gaps, improve cohesion among disparate organizations and streamline 
logistics during the execution of actual interventions. U.S. and NATO forces should 
adopt similar exercises and expand them to include megacity scenarios to better prepare 
for urban intervention. 
(3) U.S. military and NATO forces should establish enduring relationships 
with civilian agencies and experts versed in the vulnerabilities and 
resiliencies of urban environments prior to interventions. 
The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledges that cooperation 
between interagency and international partners produces strategic military success.160 
The 2015 NSS specifically mentions mayors of megacities as power brokers in this new 
global paradigm.161 It is clear that megacities are gaining strategic significance, and that 
any successful intervention will require the full weight of civilian and military expertise. 
The U.S.-based Rockefeller Foundation developed a paradigm for analyzing 
urban centers. In particular, it created the concept of “urban resiliencies” which are the 
following: “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and 
systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses 
and acute shocks they experience.”162 In their 2015 paper, “Urban Resilience” post-
conflict and stabilization experts André Kahlmeyer and Milena Isakovic Suni argue that 
the relevant elements of urban resilience for a NATO intervention are risk reduction and 
assessment, infrastructure protection, training and public awareness, early warning 
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systems, and capacities for rebuilding.163 While the expertise needed to effectively 
integrate Kahlmeyer’s and Suni’s recommendations into military planning may lie 
outside of the military itself, building and formalizing relationships with civilian agencies 
and experts that have relevant urban expertise will make military interventions in 
megacities more responsive to the underlying causes of conflict. This approach should 
foster more rapid recovery and stabilization after an intervention.  
While civilian agencies often have a wealth of expertise, they frequently lack 
sufficient personnel to implement plans. This is particularly true in large-scale disaster or 
intervention scenarios. For example, the 2010 RAND study The U.S. Military Response 
to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake notes that, while the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) had the relevant 
expertise to respond to this humanitarian disaster, they lacked sufficient manpower and 
staffing.164 The U.S. Military augmented OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Teams 
(DART) with personnel and helped provide management and de-confliction for over 
1,000 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating beneath the OFDA 
umbrella.165 Pre-coordinated relationships and on-the-ground cooperation between the 
U.S. Military and OFDA allowed USAID to fulfill its responsibility as the lead federal 
agency for the disaster response.166 Combining both civilian and military expertise may 
be mutually beneficial to multiple organizations, while provided the most effective 
intervention possible. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the projected growth of existing megacities, and proliferation of 
new megacities in the near future, requires military planning for intervention today in 
order to prevent major loss of life and instability in the event of future natural or 
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manmade disasters. This thesis aimed to provide a general orientation to the attributes of 
megacities, challenges for governance of megacities, and how the unique elements of 
megacities can affect military planning and intervention. To help plan for intervention 
into megacities, the UIM model offers a tool for rapid assessment of a megacity and 
suggestions for what to focus on and why. While just a beginning, the UIM model should 
provide a useful starting point for addressing what will likely be a U.S. or NATO 
operation in the near future. 
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APPENDIX A. MEGATRENDS, GAME CHANGERS, AND 
TECTONIC SHIFTS 
Megatrends167 
Individual Empowerment  Individual empowerment will accelerate owing to poverty reduction, growth of the global middle 
class, greater educational attainment, widespread use of new communications and manufacturing 
technologies, and health-care advances.  
Diffusion of Power  There will not be any hegemonic power. Power will shift to networks and coalitions in a multipolar 
world.  
Demographic Patterns  The demographic arc of instability will narrow. Economic growth might decline in “aging” 
countries. Sixty percent of the world’s population will live in urbanized areas; migration will 
increase.  
Food, Water, Energy Nexus  Demand for these resources will grow substantially owing to an increase in the global population. 





Will global volatility and imbalances among players with different economic interests result in 
collapse? Or will greater multipolarity lead to increased resiliency in the global economic order?  
Governance Gap  Will governments and institutions be able to adapt fast enough to harness change instead of being 
overwhelmed by it?  
Potential for Increased 
Conflict  
Will rapid changes and shifts in power lead to more intrastate and interstate conflicts?  
Wider Scope of Regional 
Instability  
Will regional instability, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, spill over and create global 
insecurity?  
Impact of New 
Technologies  
Will technological breakthroughs be developed in time to boost economic productivity and solve the 
problems caused by a growing world population, rapid urbanization, and climate change?  
Role of the United States  Will the U.S. be able to work with new partners to reinvent the international system?  
 
Tectonic Shifts Between Now and 2030169  
Growth of the Global 
Middle Class  
Middle classes most everywhere in the developing world are poised to expand substantially in terms 
of both absolute numbers and the percentage of the population that can claim middle-class status 
during the next 15–20 years.  
Wider Access to Lethal and 
Disruptive Technologies  
A wider spectrum of instruments of war—especially precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments, 
and bioterror weaponry—will become accessible. Individuals and small groups will have the 
capability to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption—a capability formerly the monopoly of 
states.  
Definitive Shift of Economic 
Power to the East and 
South  
The US, European, and Japanese share of global income is projected to fall from 56 percent today to 
well under half by 2030. In 2008, China overtook the U.S. as the world’s largest saver; by 2020, 
emerging markets’ share of financial assets is projected to almost double.  
Unprecedented and 
Widespread Aging  
Whereas in 2012 only Japan and Germany have matured beyond a median age of 45 years, most 
European countries, South Korea, and Taiwan will have entered the post-mature age category by 
2030. Migration will become more globalized as both rich and developing countries suffer from 
workforce shortages.  
Urbanization  Today’s roughly 50-percent urban population will climb to nearly 60 percent, or 4.9 billion people, 
in 2030. Africa will gradually replace Asia as the region with the highest urbanization growth rate. 
Urban centers are estimated to generate 80 percent of economic growth; the potential exists to apply 
modern technologies and infrastructure, promoting better use of scarce resources.  
Food and Water Pressures  Demand for food is expected to rise at least 35 percent by 2030 while demand for water is expected 
to rise by 40 percent. Nearly half of the world’s population will live in areas experiencing severe 
water stress. Fragile states in Africa and the Middle East are most at risk of experiencing food and 
water shortages, but China and India are also vulnerable.  
                                                
167.  Adapted from: National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, ii-v, 9–12, 16–
19, 21–27, 31–35. 
168.  Adapted from: National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative, ii, vi-x, 51–58, 
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APPENDIX B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLYING THE URBAN 
INTERVENTION MODEL 
   Urban Intervention Model 
  Step 1 - Assess Urban Environment and Relationships 
   1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems 
   1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes 
   1.3 Develop Potential and Appropriate Interventions 
   1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
  Step 2 – Decide and Assign Forces 
  Step 3 – Intervene 
  Step 4 – Evaluate 
 
Step 1 Assess Urban Environment and Relationships 
The planner applies the Urban Intervention Model to inform decision making for 
a potential intervention in a given city. The Director of Operations directs planning 
priorities according to the Commander’s guidance, mission, and the strategic operational 
environment. 
 
Step 1.1 Identify and Prioritize Problems 
a. The planner identifies problems, in the form of problem statements, for the 
given city that include some or all of the political, military, economic, 
social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time 
(PMESII-PT) factors judged as relevant in a potential intervention.  
• Problem statements should clearly capture the challenges in 
simple language for each key problem. 
• Problem statements should be orthogonal (distinct) to avoid 
duplication of problem weighting in later steps. 
• PMESII-PT should factors provide problem categories 
which must relate to existing problems in the given city 
b. Planners select key problems that best meet mission intent and then 
prioritize them.  
• Key problems must directly impact the desired end state. 
Cairene Case Example: First Iteration – Step 1.1 
Identify Problems: 
• Social: The city does not have sufficient food, water, or 
medical supplies to address the affected population. 
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• Infrastructure: The earthquake damaged the air traffic 
control system, rendering it inoperable. No emergency air 
traffic control capability exists at Cairene International 
Airport. There are no incoming or outgoing aircraft. 
Blocked roadways prevent the flow of aid and resources 
from Cairene International Airport into the city. 
• Military: Airport security personnel are not at their posts 
creating risk at the airport. 
Prioritize Problems: 
• The J3 decides that “Infrastructure…” is the key planning 
problem because the airport must be operational before 
intervention forces can address any other key problem. 
Step 1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes 
The planner concisely states desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes relative to the 
prioritized key problems. 
Cairene Case Example: First Iteration – Step 1.2 
• Infrastructure: The earthquake damaged the air traffic 
control system, rendering it inoperable. No emergency air 
traffic control capability exists at Cairene International 
Airport. There are no incoming or outgoing aircraft. 
Blocked roadways prevent the flow of aid and resources 
from Cairene International Airport into the city. 
• The desired impact is to enable the flow of aid into the city 
by reestablishing emergency air traffic control as the major 
output. Once the international community can establish a 
permanent airlift into the Cairene International Airport the 
availability of aid on the ground will alleviate the 
population’s needs. Having a sufficient aid supply in 
Cairene is the desired outcome  
• Establish emergency air traffic control 
• Reestablish local air traffic control capability 
• Secure airport 
• Open flow of aid to airport 
 
Step 1.3 Develop Potential and Appropriate Intervention Actions 
a. The planner identifies possible intervention action types that appropriately 
address the key problem(s) and corresponding desired impacts, outputs, or 
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outcomes. These action types become the measures of performance 
(MOPs). The MOPs are binary; they have been accomplished, or they 
have not been accomplished. 
b. The planner conceptualizes the following details for every intervention 
action type in order to reduce risk for the mission and to make sure that 
the associated actions are in accordance with the end state and national 
interest:  
• Where not to do action and where to do action: considers 
locations associated with greater risk against locations that 
offer greater chances of operational success 
• With whom not to do action and with whom to do action: 
considers all options with respect to who to support and 
partner with, and considers which entities to avoid; these 
entities could be host nation security forces, civilians, 
NGOs, licit/illicit, et cetera 
• What not to do and what to do: considers which type of 
activities should and should not be conducted 
• When not to do action and when to do action: considers the 
time in which the action takes place; time in which forces, 
supplies, and resources can become available; duration of 
the action 
Cairene Case Example: First Iteration – Step 1.3 
 Action 1: Special Tactics Teams (STT) provide emergency air 
traffic control: 
• Where not to do action: non-standard runways (dirt, and or 
makeshift airfields) 
• Where to do action: Cairene International Airport (confirm 
length of runways, identify aid storage areas; confirm 
noncombatant evacuation routes and staging areas) 
• With whom not to do action: unaffiliated third party 
personnel to Cairene International Airport (personnel not 
employed or authorized to conduct operations at the 
airport) 
• With whom to do action: technically experienced local 
nationals including, air traffic controllers, airport security 
personnel, technical avionics contractors, personnel whose 
association gives decisive access to a vital areas or objects; 
combined military and civilian personnel  
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• What not to do: permanently replace local air traffic 
controllers; introduce large numbers of external forces 
• What to do: temporarily provide air traffic control 
assistance; assist with reestablishment of the local air traffic 
control capability; possible; ensure insertion method is 
appropriate for destination 
• When not to do action: an alternative with better 
capabilities becomes available; Cairene no longer needs aid  
• When to do action: provide emergency air traffic control 
assistance within 24 hours; upon receipt of request for 
assistance from Cairene 
 Action 2: A combination of Contingency Response Group (CRG) 
and of Combat Communications Group (CCG) provides 
emergency air traffic control systems (tower, TACAN, radar, et 
cetera): 
• Where not to do action: non-standard runways (dirt, and or 
makeshift airfields) 
• Where to do action: Cairene International Airport (confirm 
length of runways, identify aid storage areas; confirm 
noncombatant evacuation routes and staging areas) 
• With whom not to do action: unaffiliated third party 
personnel to Cairene International Airport. (personnel not 
employed or authorized to conduct operations at the 
airport) 
• With whom to do action: technically experienced local 
nationals including: air traffic controllers; airport security 
personnel; technical avionics contractors; personnel whose 
association gives decisive access to a vital areas or objects; 
combined military and civilian personnel 
• What not to do: permanently replace local air traffic 
controllers 
• What to do: temporarily provide air traffic control 
assistance; assist with reestablishment of air traffic control 
capability 
• When not to do action: an alternative with better 
capabilities becomes available; Cairene no longer needs aid 
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• When to do action: provide air traffic control assistance 
within 76 hours upon receipt of request for assistance from 
Cairene 
 Action 3: TSOC remotely advises and facilitates local air traffic 
controllers to resume operations: 
• Where not to do action: non-standard runways (dirt, and or 
makeshift airfields) 
• Where to do action: Cairene International Airport (confirm 
length of runways, identify aid storage areas; confirm 
noncombatant evacuation routes and staging areas) 
• With whom not to do action: unaffiliated third party 
personnel to Cairene International Airport (personnel not 
employed or authorized to conduct operations at the 
airport) 
• With whom to do action: technically experienced local 
nationals including: air traffic controllers; airport security 
personnel; technical avionics contractors; personnel whose 
association gives decisive access to a vital areas or objects; 
combined military and civilian personnel 
• What not to do: permanently replace local air traffic 
controllers; place U.S. personnel on the ground 
• What to do: temporarily provide air traffic control 
assistance; assist with reestablishment of air traffic control 
capability by providing remote technical expertise through 
digital communications  
• When not to do action: an alternative with better 
capabilities becomes available; Cairene no longer needs aid 
• When to do action: provide air traffic control assistance 
within four hours, upon receipt of request for assistance 
from Cairene 
 Action 4: Contingency TSOC facilitates airdrops to deliver aid into 
Cairene: 
• Where not to do action: built up locations; locations with 
obstacles for air delivery mechanisms 
• Where to do action: Airport, sports fields, locations with 
the capacity to receive aid, or locations for storage and/or 
distribution 
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• With whom not to do action: illicit criminal networks that 
could take advantage of the aid deliveries  
• With whom to do action: city government authorities and 
NGOs, which are able to control and distribute aid  
• What not to do: permanently replace the flow the regular 
supply of goods through Cairenean channels 
• What to do: temporarily deliver aid via air drop; contract 
civilian aircraft to airdrop aid 
• When not to do action: better alternative aid supply sources 
becomes available; Cairene no longer needs aid  
• When to do action: upon receipt of request from Cairene or 
upon the approval for executing airdrops, deliver airdrops 
as soon as possible; whenever host organizations on the 
ground are ready to receive the air drops 
 Action 5: Combat TSOC provides no direct support and only 
monitors the situation: 
• Where not to do action: inside the country or Cairene  
• Where to do action: not applicable  
• With whom not to do action: any entity which is not related 
to the relief effort 
• With whom to do action: not applicable 
• What not to do: interfere with the supply of aid 
• What to do: not applicable 
• When not to do action: not applicable 
• When to do action: not applicable 
These conceptualizations highlight the relationship of intervention actions to the 
environment in terms of time, space, and force. 
 
Step 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
The planner conceptualizes the potential effects of interventions for every action 
type being considered. Above, in Step 1.3, the planner conceived five action types. 
Therefore, the planner analyses each of the five action types to consider the potential 
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effects of intervention. The analysis of these effects are the measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs). This step produces analysis for the five action types conceived above with 
corresponding effects that should and should not be created.  
 
Cairene Case Example: First Iteration – Step 1.4 
 J3 conceptualizes effects that should not be made and effects but instead 
be made per intervention action:  
 Action 1: Special Tactics Teams (STT) provide emergency air 
traffic control: 
• Effects that should not be created: do not want to exclude 
local air traffic controllers from operations, even if they 
cannot use their equipment; do not allow local air traffic 
controllers to resume full control of operations until they 
are able to safely direct air traffic 
• Effects that should be created: the international community 
and foreign militaries support Cairene´s population; should 
consult with local air traffic controllers to gain their 
knowledge for operations specific to Cairene; should 
identify and facilitate the equipment, expertise, and 
capabilities air traffic controllers need to reestablish local 
control of operations 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene must rely upon its 
own resources to provide aid to the population until they 
are able to open the airport; international community does 
not supply aid or provide military forces; food and medical 
shortages increase rapidly in Cairene and competition over 
these scarce resources creates conflict in Cairene 
• Effects of taking this action: demonstrates the international 
community’s and foreign militaries’ support to Cairene’s 
population; immediate air traffic control operations allow a 
greater amount of aid to flow into Cairene within 24 hours, 
thus reducing human suffering; Cairene receives a 
sufficient amount of aid to meet the peoples’ demands; 
competition for aid will decrease in Cairene – this may 
prevent escalating conflict within Cairene U.S. military 
assistance addresses moral and bi-lateral obligations to the 
affected people in Cairene; immediate air traffic control 
operations that open the flow of aid could avoid the spread 
of regional instability and supports U.S. national interest; 
the STT maintains a small footprint at the airport creating 
the impression that the U.S. military presence is not 
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interfering in the country’s affairs, there will also be lower 
costs in manpower and resources for related security and 
sustainment operations of forces on the ground 
 
 Action 2: A combination of Contingency Response Group (CRG) 
and of Combat Communications Group (CCG) provides 
emergency air traffic control systems (tower, TACAN, radar, et 
cetera): 
• Effects that should not be created: do not want to exclude 
local air traffic controllers from operations, even if they 
cannot use their equipment; do not allow local air traffic 
controllers to resume full control of operations until they 
are able to safely direct air traffic 
• Effects that should be created: the international community 
and foreign militaries support Cairene´s population; should 
consult with local air traffic controllers to gain their 
knowledge for operations specific to Cairene; should 
identify and facilitate the equipment, expertise, and 
capabilities air traffic controllers need to reestablish local 
control of operations 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene must rely upon its 
own resources to provide aid to the population until they 
are able to open the airport; international community does 
not supply aid or provide military forces; food and medical 
shortages increase rapidly in Cairene and competition over 
these scarce resources creates conflict in Cairene 
• Effects of taking this action: demonstrate the international 
community and foreign military support to Cairene’s 
population; air traffic control operations will allow a 
greater amount of aid to flow into Cairene within 72 hours, 
thus reducing human suffering; Cairene receives a 
sufficient amount of aid to meet the peoples’ demands; 
competition for aid will decrease in Cairene – this may 
prevent escalating conflict within Cairene U.S. military 
assistance addresses moral and bi-lateral obligations to the 
affected people in Cairene; air traffic control operations 
that open the flow of aid could avoid the spread of regional 
instability and supports U.S. national interest; CRG and 
CCG maintain a large force presence at the airport – the 
U.S. military presence on the ground can create the 
impression that the U.S. is interfering in the country’s 
affairs; this action can create an obligation to continue 
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operations until Cairene International Airport has restored 
all necessary systems to control aircraft; additional costs in 
manpower and resources for related security and 
sustainment operations of forces on the ground; if security 
conditions in Cairene worsen, then the associated 
responsibility of providing air traffic control could drag the 
U.S. into an unanticipated conflict  
 
 Action 3: TSOC (remotely) advises and facilitates local air traffic 
controllers to resume operations: 
• Effects that should not be created: do not want to exclude 
local air traffic controllers from operations, nor influence 
local air traffic controllers to resume full control of 
operations until they are able to safely direct air traffic 
• Effects that should be created: the international community 
and foreign militaries support Cairene´s population; should 
consult with local air traffic controllers to gain their 
knowledge for operations specific to Cairene; should 
identify and facilitate the equipment, expertise, and 
capabilities air traffic controllers need to reestablish local 
control of operations 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene must rely upon its 
own resources to provide aid to the population until they 
are able to open the airport; international community does 
not supply aid or provide military forces; food and medical 
shortages increase rapidly in Cairene and competition over 
these scarce resources creates conflict in Cairene 
• Effects of taking this action: demonstrate the international 
community and foreign military support to Cairene’s 
population; Cairene is fully responsible and able to execute 
air traffic control operations without any foreign military 
presence on the ground; increased likelihood of delaying 
the resumption of operations at Cairene´s Airport will not 
provide a sufficient amount of aid to meet the total demand 
for aid increased miscommunications due to remote 
advising; there are no U.S. forces at the airport to relay 
situational updates for TSOC  
 
 Action 4: TSOC facilitates airdrops to deliver aid into Cairene 
• Effects that should not be created: the airdrop should not 
favor any part of the city or any part of the population over 
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another; it should not harm civilians; it should not create 
increased competition for aid 
• Effects that should be created: should airdrop aid to 
different locations in the city at the same time by using 
multiple drop zones; should maximize the amount of aid 
airdropped until airport is opened 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene must rely upon its 
own resources to provide aid to the population until they 
are able to open the airport; international community does 
not supply aid or provide military forces; food and medical 
shortages increase rapidly in Cairene and competition over 
these scarce resources creates conflict in Cairene 
• Effects of taking this action: demonstrate the international 
community and foreign military support to Cairene’s 
population; airdrops may not provide a sufficient amount of 
aid to meet the total demand for aid; competition for access 
to aid will increase in Cairene – this may lead to increased 
conflict; U.S. military assistance addresses moral and bi-
lateral obligations to the affected people in Cairene; 
immediate airdrop operations that open the flow of aid 
could avoid the spread of regional instability– supports 
U.S. national interest 
 
 Action 5: TSOC provides no direct support and only monitors the 
situation: 
• Effects that should not be created: should not forfeit access 
to up-to-date information that allows an update of 
developing situations in Cairene 
• Effects that should be created: Cairene is solely responsible 
for coordinating relief assistance and opening flows of aid; 
local nationals open the Cairene International Airport on 
their timeline; no impression of any foreign military 
presence on the ground 
• Effects of not taking this action: failure to monitor the 
situation denies the U.S. up to date information for decision 
making 
• Effects of taking this action: International community fails 
to provide adequate support to the suffering and greater 
numbers of people die; no force commitments reduce costs; 
monitoring conditions in Cairene are reliant upon updates 
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from local nationals; U.S. violates bi-lateral agreements to 
help Cairene during times of need 
 
Step 2 – Decide and Assign Forces 
In Step 2, Decide and Assign Forces, planners should carefully consider the most 
appropriate combination of military forces, civilian organizations, and remote support 
activities within the overall strategy to determine whether or not intervention should 
occur. Duplicity of efforts can rapidly drain finite resources. Planners should also 
consider all available resources to illuminate unnecessary forces and rapidly tailor 
sufficient intervening forces to fulfil the needs that are not able to be addressed through 
local resources. The impetus for Step 2 leverages existing local personnel, equipment, 
and resources to accomplish the mission in the shortest amount of time and with the 
fewest number of external resources. The final consideration, if the decision is made to 
intervene, should focus upon what to address given the available time, space, and forces. 
Once the planner identifies appropriate and distinct intervention actions, the planner then 
develops criteria for choosing appropriate intervention actions and conducts a pairwise 
comparison of the criteria and intervention alternatives using an excel Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) decision tool. 
The AHP, a multi-attribute decision making tool, processes the consideration of 
multiple intervention types and multiple criteria.170 The user can easily input changes and 
run new calculations and analysis.171 Furthermore, the AHP allows a sensitivity analysis 
function to further analyze results. The sensitivity analysis shows the flexibility and 
robustness of courses of action when the criteria change, or environmental dynamics 
force the implementation or removal of criteria. 
 
 
                                                
170.  William P. Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making & Mathematical Modeling for Decision 
Making, AHP and TOPSIS, DA 4410” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 
2015), 1-10; Saaty, T., “An exposition of the AHP in reply to the paper Remarks on the analytical hierarchy 
process by JS Dyer,” Management Science, 36, no. 3, 1990, 259–268. 
171.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1–10. 
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Cairene Case Example: First Iteration – Step 2 
 The J3 develops and prioritizes criteria to evaluate intervention 
alternatives, and defines the following criteria for decision making:  
• Moral Obligation: The United States has the means and the 
expertise to intervene, failing to do so will result in the 
unnecessary loss of life. Bilateral and multi-lateral 
international agreements require some kind of U.S. 
response to Cairene. An insufficient response to the disaster 
could harm U.S. relations abroad. 
• Capacity of Flow: Amount of aid that can be brought to 
Cairene; reduced throughput capacity of life sustaining 
commodities such as food, water, and medical aid will 
cause further human suffering. Additionally, effective 
stabilization and recovery necessitates transportation 
network repair since it is an integral part resources of all 
type.  
• Rapid Deployment and Flexibility: Rapid deployment will 
get forces on the ground faster, allowing the TSOC to build 
a more complete picture of what is happening. Flexibility 
means the military force is able to deal with currently 
unforeseen problems as they arise. 
• Ability to Build Capacity: Cairenean capacity to self-
recover by capitalizing on its resiliencies will speed the 
delivery of aid, while containing destruction in future 
disasters. Cairene’s capacity to provide services to the 
people has been degraded because of the earthquake. 
Military forces that can help to rebuild local capacity will 
help stabilize long term conditions in Cairene.  
• Risk to Own Troops: Conducting operations safely and 
without causing an international incident is of utmost 
concern for all deployments, particularly in peacetime. 
Planners should consider the potential loss of men, 
weapons, or equipment. 
• Regional Stability: Cairene influences regional and 
therefore worldwide stability. Containing the effects of 
destruction and facilitating a rapid economic recovery may 
reduce regional turmoil. Rapid actions to prevent civil 
discontent and meet essential needs will help to stabilize 
Cairene. 
• Obligation versus Cost: Long-term commitment; once 
committed to intervention, Cairene may expect the United 
81 
States to provide long-term assistance which can incur a 
high operational costs. Planners should consider which 
intervention forces can operate with reduced costs without 
incurring long-term obligations. 
• Intervention Conflict: Being drawn into a conflict; criminal
elements and their potential connection to terrorist rhetoric
and networks pose the risk of drawing the U.S. forces on
the ground into a conflict. The visible presence of U.S.
forces in Cairene could lead to conflict within Caireen.
The planner uses judgment to weight criteria and conducts a pairwise 
comparison with an excel AHP decision tool.172 Table 7 below shows how 
each criterion is ranked against every other criterion: 
Table 7.   First Iteration Criteria Pairwise Comparison 
• Note that the intensity is rated on a scale of 1 to 9 with 1
being the lowest relative importance and 9 being the
highest importance.
• Table 8 below depicts the eigenvector values and ranking
of criteria after the pairwise comparison has been
completed:
172.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
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Moral Obligation 0.30 1 
Capacity of Flow 0.28 2 
Rapid Deployment and Flexibility 0.15 3 
Building Capacity 0.10 4 
Risk to Own Troops 0.07 5 
Regional Stability 0.05 6 
Obligation/High Cost 0.03 7 
Intervention Conflict 0.03 8 
• The planner weights intervention alternatives against each
of the weighted criteria individually, and then conducts a
second pairwise comparison.173
• STT: Special Tactics Teams
• CRG and CCG: Contingency Response Group (CRG) and
Combat Communications Groups (CCG)
• Advise Host Nation: not responsible for air traffic control
operations
• Air Drops: deliver aid without ground presence
• No Support to Intervention
• The planner identifies the prioritized ranking of alternatives
against each of the eight criterion. For example, Table 9
below shows how each of the intervention types is
considered against the moral obligation criteria:
173.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
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Table 9.   First Iteration Intervention Actions Pairwise Comparison Against 
Criterion – Moral Obligation 
• The planner conducts this comparison for each of the
remaining seven criteria.
• Upon completing the pairwise comparisons, the planner
determines the eigenvector values for each of the
intervention actions against all eight criteria, as seen in
Table 10:
Table 10.   First Iteration Intervention Actions, Eigenvector Values, and Ranking 
Alternatives – Intervention Actions Eigenvector Value Ranking 
CRG and CCG – Contingency Response Group (CRG) and 
Combat Communications Groups (CCG) 0.37 1 
STT– Special Tactics Teams 0.28 2 
Advise Host Nation – not responsible for air traffic control 
operations 0.14 3 
Air Drops – deliver aid without ground presence 0.13 4 
No Support 0.07 5 
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• The planner runs a sensitivity analysis below, in Figure 3,
to better understand the robustness of the intervention
actions against each of the criteria and to identify the point
at which a change in criteria values yields a different
recommended result:
Figure 3.  First Iteration AHP Sensitivity Analysis174 
174.  William P. Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making & Mathematical Modeling for Decision 
Making, AHP and TOPSIS, DA 4410” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 
2015), 1-10; Saaty, T., “An exposition of the AHP in reply to the paper Remarks on the analytical hierarchy 
process by JS Dyer,” Management Science, 36, no. 3, 1990, 259–268. 
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• The 0.05 sensitivity analysis shows that the STT and CRG/
CCG remain the best suited actions if criteria change, while 
the No Support action becomes a better choice over Advise 
and Air Drop actions. 
 
Planners may apply multiple attribute decision making, demonstrated in Step 2, in 
any step within the model where multiple alternatives must be analyzed against a set of 
criteria. AHP is especially useful when a diverse group with highly divergent 
perspectives must reach a consensus on which alternative is best. It can take any set of 
quantitative or qualitative data to conduct a pairwise comparison that yields an objective 
ranking of alternatives. 
Step 3, Intervene, should incorporate the concepts of what, where, with whom, 
and when to take action. Once military forces are in the megacity, they confirm or deny 
the conceptualized intervention actions planned through assessments and interactions. 
Feedback from ground forces to higher headquarters drives updates to the common 
operating picture. There is ample opportunity to explore how information should be 
collected, analyzed, and distributed in ways that build upon the concepts presented in 
Chapter III and the UIM. 
Step 4, Evaluate, planner must consider how to monitor changes in the city, how 
to record the changes, and how to update the common operating picture to make 
decisions within the intervention. The process should allow rapid fundamental changes to 
the concepts of what, where, with whom, and when to take (or not take) action. This step 
must be sufficiently robust to correct intervention actions that are in conflict with 
concepts of what not to do. The planner must consider how to monitor changes in the city 
through assessment of MOPs and MOEs, how to record the changes, and how to update 
the common operating picture to make decisions within the intervention. The process 
should allow rapid and fundamental changes to the concepts of what, where, with whom, 
and when to take (or not take) action. Step 4 must also be sufficiently robust to correct 
intervention actions which are in conflict with concepts of what not to do. 
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UIM Application: Second Iteration  
Prior to UIM Application: Iteration 1, the TSOC J3 issued the following planning 
priorities to the TSOC staff: 
The desired end state is the restoration of Cairene’s ability to receive and 
distribute aid from the international community. Any disruption of timely 
aid delivery or interrupted government services will likely result in local 
and then possibly regional security instability. Within the next 72 hours, 
the staff should immediately focus upon opening the flow of aid into 
Cairene. Once aid is flowing into Cairene, shift planning priorities to assist 
local security forces with stabilization. The TSOC will continue to support 
the U.S. Department of State once they are in the lead. 
At the completion of UIM Application: Iteration 1, the TSOC successfully opens 
Cairene International Airport opening the flow of aid into the city. This enables the 
TSOC to transition responsibility for planning and organizing relief efforts to the 
Department of State, and shift priority to the city’s security situation as stated in the 
initial planning guidance. The TSOC J3 issues the following revised planning priorities to 
the TSOC staff: 
Assist local and state security organizations in preventing the alliance of 
local criminal organizations with the regional terrorist organization. 
Exploit local knowledge and networks used by criminal organizations to 
entice them to assist Cairene officials in preventing terrorist or insurgent 
actions. When possible, disrupt, destroy, or neutralize the regional terrorist 
organization without implicating Western military forces or escalating 
conflicts. 
The TSOC J3 directs the staff to reevaluate conditions in Cairene and initiate UIM 
Application: Iteration 2. 
Step 1 Assess Urban Environment and Relationships 
The planner applies the UIM to inform decision making for a potential 
intervention in a given city. The Director of Operations directs planning priorities 
according to the Commander’s guidance, mission, and the strategic operational 
environment. 
Cairene Case Example: Second Iteration – Step 1.1 
Identify Problems 
• Military: Attempting to expand its network into Cairene, a 
regional terrorist organization made financial offers to 
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criminal elements in exchange for terrorist actions. 
Successful terrorist attacks in Cairene will increase regional 
support for the terrorist organization and will increase 
regional instability. Their actions could incite insurgent 
activities. The Cairene government wants to disrupt 
terrorist recruitment activities. 
• Government: Threatening rule of law, the Opposing Party 
sanctioned violent acts against the Ruling Party leading to 
the deaths of five prominent political figures. Low-level 
illicit activities are rampant across the city, and the criminal 
elements are beginning to increase the level of violence 
against the Ruling party members with the support of the 
Opposing Party. The Cairene government expressed a 
desire to increase its support among residents in the slums. 
• Social: Slum dwellers want more equitable treatment from 
the Cairene government. Specifically, the residents in the 
slums want the Cairene government to provide services, 
and they want increased political representation from the 
Opposing Party.  
Prioritize Problems 
  TSOC planners identify criminal interests in Cairene slums, 
Opposition Party grievances with Ruling Party members and 
political inequity, and growing regional terrorist influence as key 
problems. These problems fall under the PMESII-PT headings of 
Military, Social, and Government. The J3 prioritizes Government- 
related grievances over Military and Social, since extending rule of 
law into the slums will contain the spread of criminal activity 
across the city and deny access to terrorist organizations. 
 
Step 1.2 State Desired Impacts, Outputs, or Outcomes 
The planner concisely states desired impacts, outputs, or outcomes relative to the 
prioritized key problems. 
Cairene Case Example: Second Iteration – Step 1.2 
 Government –Threatening rule of law, the Opposing Party 
sanctioned violent acts against the Ruling Party leading to the 
deaths of five prominent political figures. Low-level illicit 
activities are rampant across the city, and the criminal elements are 
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beginning to increase the level of violence against the Ruling party 
members with the support of the Opposing Party. The Cairene 
government expressed a desire to increase its support among 
residents in the slums. 
• The desired outcome is to extend rule of law in the slums 
by co-opting and integrating criminal leadership into local 
formal governance and deny terrorist organizations access 
to the city. SOF cannot directly target the Opposition Party, 
yet the party’s role is central in all emerging security 
threats. However, the criminal elements rely exclusively 
upon illicit activities to meet their financial interests. If the 
Cairene government can become more inclusive of the 
Opposition and formalize a relationship with the criminal 
leadership Party, there could be an opportunity to reduce 
security threats.  
• Cairene government recognizes slums as formal residential 
districts; commits to improve government services to 
slums. 
• Cairene security forces and U.S. SOF establish contact with 
criminal elements’ leadership; create a dialogue between 
criminal leadership in the slums and the police and 
Opposition Party leadership to extend rule of law. 
• The Opposition Party ceases to sanction violent acts against 
the Ruling Party leadership. 
• The regional terrorist organization is unable to recruit 
Caireneans, nor conduct acts of terror in Cairene.  
 
Step 1.3 Develop Potential and Appropriate Intervention Actions  
Cairene Case Example: Second Iteration – Step 1.3 
 Action 1: U.S. SOF advises and assists Cairene´s security forces to 
establish an increased presence within the slums to extend the rule 
of law. 
• Where not to do action: areas with access to the police, 
areas under informal control but generally law abiding 
• Where to do action: under-governed areas, which have 
expressed an interest in interacting with formal government 
entities 
• With whom not to do action: illicit organization capable of 
extending security into the slums but have no interest 
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working with formal government entities, security forces 
notable for excessive corruption  
• With whom to do action: legitimate Cairene’s security 
forces, units with particular positive reputations 
• What not to do: build long-term dependence on U.S. SOF 
to establish and maintain security  
• What to do: place Cairene’s forces in the lead for all 
interactions with the population 
• When not to do action: partner forces reveal to be 
excessively corrupt; partner forces abuse the population; 
when partner forces are able to provide security without 
U.S. SOF assistance 
• When to do action: within 24 hours establish contact with 
Cairene’s security forces to begin partner force selection 
 Action 2: U.S. SOF brokers negotiation talks between criminal 
elements’ leadership and the police and Opposition Party 
leadership to integrate slum dwellers into security and governance 
roles within the slums. 
• Where not to do action: areas of the slums which are not 
under the control of the opposition party 
• Where to do action: areas where the Opposition Party 
wields the greatest influence 
• With whom not to do action: criminal elements unwilling to 
integrate with formal governments 
• With whom to do action: Opposition Party leadership, 
power brokers, and informal leaders capable of leveraging 
public opinion in the slums 
• What not to do: enable the Opposition Party to usurp rule of 
law in the slums 
• What to do: allow Cairene government leaders to take the 
lead in negotiations, facilitate negotiation talks between 
Opposition Party and security forces 
• When not to do action: prior to assessing legitimate actors 
and key leaders critical to the negotiation process 
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• When to do action: once key leaders and legitimate actors 
are identified 
 Action 3: U.S. SOF and Cairenean security forces conduct direct 
action operations to degrade the regional terrorist organization. 
• Where not to do action: Built up areas where regional 
terrorists may use civilians for human shields 
• Where to do action: known locations of terrorist activity 
with low threat to civilian population 
• With whom not to do action: security forces notable for 
excessive corruption  
• With whom to do action: legitimate Cairene’s security 
forces, units with particular positive reputations and 
specific training in direct action missions 
• What not to do: build long-term dependence on U.S. SOF 
to conduct adequate anti-terrorist operations 
• What to do: place Cairene’s forces in the lead for planning 
and executing direct actions against terrorist elements 
• When not to do action: partner forces reveal themselves to 
be excessively corrupt or if OPSEC breach occurs; partner 
forces abuse the population when partner forces are able to 
conduct direct action missions without U.S. SOF 
assistance. 
• When to do action: within 24 hours establish contact with 
Cairene’s security forces to begin partner force selection 
 Action 4: U.S. forces only secure aid distribution networks used by 
the international community relief workers. All other security 
matters are relegated to Cairenean security forces. 
• Where not to do action: outside any location or area where 
the distribution of aid takes place 
• Where to do action: aid distribution networks (roads, 
supply lines) and locations that are unsafe or are related to 
higher risk of interruptions through offensive criminal 
activities  
• With whom not to do action: security forces that are not 
tasked to support the relief effort 
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• With whom to do action: security forces connected to the 
aid distribution 
• What not to do: secure areas that are not affiliated with the 
distribution of aid 
• What to do: use of force only if criminal elements seriously 
disturb aid distribution 
• When not to do action: international relief workers deny 
security provided by U.S. forces 
• When to do action: international relief workers request U.S. 
forces to provide security, peak hours of transit and 
distribution 
  It is neither feasible nor appropriate to introduce a large 
external force into Cairene. Anti-western and terrorist groups could 
exploit the presence of large foreign military forces through their 
rhetoric. U.S. SOF can, however, advise local security forces on 
reintegrating criminal elements within municipal security and 
governance roles in the existing slums. SOF can also facilitate the 
dialogue between police and former rivals within the criminal 
organizations. 
Step 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
Cairene Case Example: Second Iteration – Step 1.4 
 Action 1: U.S. SOF advises and assists Cairene´s security forces to 
establish an increased presence within the slums to extend the rule 
of law. 
• Effects that should not be created: cause Cairene’s 
population lose confidence in city security forces, alienate 
marginal population with growing interests in interacting 
with formal government entities, empower Cairene’s 
security forces to exercise excessive corruption, enable 
Cairene’s security forces to abuse the population 
• Effects that should be created: build confidence in 
Cairene’s forces by appropriate show of force, enable 
Cairene’s forces to become visible to the population and to 
extend rule of law into the slums, enable Cairene’s forces 
to conduct security operation without requiring the 
assistance of U.S. SOF, build legitimacy for Cairene’s 
government in under governed areas of the city 
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• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene’s forces will not 
increase capacity or capability; Cairene’s forces may 
continue to neglect the slum, criminal network continue to 
spread influence within the slum; Criminal networks are 
enabled to project power beyond the slums and to areas 
traditionally governed by rule of law. 
• Effects of taking this action: U.S. demonstrates resolve and 
commitment to Cairene government and security forces; 
U.S provides appropriate mentorship to security forces; 
U.S. fulfils obligations to assist the people of Cairene; U.S. 
safeguards national and regional interest by containing 
rising instability within the city. 
 Action 2: U.S. SOF brokers negotiation talks between criminal 
elements’ leadership and the police and Opposing Party leadership 
to integrate slum dwellers into security and governance roles 
within the slums. 
• Effects that should not be created: cause Cairene’s 
population lose confidence in city security forces, alienate 
marginal population with growing interests in interacting 
with formal government entities, empower Cairene’s police 
forces to exercise excessive corruption by adopting illicit 
practice, create the perception that Cairene´s government 
loses control of the situation 
• Effects that should be created: Cairene’s government opens 
a direct line of communication to Opposition Party and 
criminal elements, builds confidence in Cairene’s forces by 
demonstrating interest in slum population, enables 
Cairene’s government to become visible to the population, 
and enable Cairene’s forces to gain insight slum population 
grievances, build legitimacy for Cairene’s government in 
under governed areas of the city. 
• Effects of not taking this action: Cairene’s forces will not 
gain insight in the grievances of the slum population; 
Cairene’s government may continue to neglect the slum; 
criminal network continue to spread influence within the 
slum; criminal networks are enabled to project power 
beyond the slums and to areas traditionally governed by 
rule of law. 
• Effects of taking this action: Cairene government 
demonstrates resolve and commitment to slum population; 
U.S provides appropriate mentorship for negotiations; U.S. 
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fulfils obligations to assist the people of Cairene; U.S. 
safeguards national and regional interest by containing 
rising instability within the city 
 Action 3: U.S. SOF and Cairenean security forces conduct direct 
action operations to degrade the regional terrorist organization. 
• Effects that should not be created: build long-term 
dependence on U.S. SOF to conduct direct action missions; 
anti-terrorism operations take precedence over, and become 
disassociated from long-term relief and stability efforts; 
alienate population by misapplication of force; disrupt long 
term relief efforts by creating collateral damage 
• Effects that should be created: disrupt and dismantle 
terrorist networks operating in Cairene, contain the spread 
of regional terrorism, de-legitimize terrorist networks and 
their affiliates, build confidence in Cairene’s forces by 
appropriate show of force, enable Cairene’s forces, enable 
Cairene’s forces to conduct direct action operations without 
requiring the assistance of U.S. SOF, build legitimacy for 
Cairene’s government and direct action security forces 
• Effects of not taking this action: Terrorist networks may 
proliferate across the region, terrorist networks may gain 
legitimacy and influence within Cairene, Cairene’s forces 
unable to project governance into the slums, criminal 
network continue to spread influence within the slum, 
criminal networks are enabled to project power beyond the 
slums and to areas traditionally governed by rule of law 
• Effects of taking this action: U.S. demonstrates resolve and 
commitment to Cairene government and security forces, 
U.S provides appropriate mentorship to security forces, 
U.S. fulfils obligations to assist the people of Cairene, U.S. 
safeguards national and regional interest by containing 
rising instability within the city 
 Action 4: U.S. forces only secure aid distribution networks used by 
the international community relief workers. All other security 
matters are relegated to Cairenean security forces. 
• Effects that should not be created: Criminal networks 
create illegitimate distribution sites for pilfered 
commodities away from aid distribution sites; international 
community relief workers only operate in the most highly 
secure areas; Cairene’s security forces become 
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overwhelmed by problems and fail to adequately address 
security matters not related to the distribution of aid 
• Effects that should be created: International community 
relief workers are confident in the U.S. forces ability to 
secure relief efforts; Necessary aid is distributed in a timely 
manner; No pilferage, theft or hijacking occurs along aid 
distribution networks; Distribution of aid is regulated, 
streamlined, and orderly; Cairene’s security forces have a 
manageable set of security related responsibilities. 
• Effects of not taking this action: Pilferage, theft and 
hijacking are likely to occur along the aid distribution 
network; Aid workers may refuse to deliver aid; Cairene’s 
security forces become overwhelmed and unable to 
effectively secure distribution routes or fulfill other security 
related responsibilities; Aid is not delivered in a timely 
fashion causing increased instability. 
• Effects of taking this action: U.S. demonstrates resolve and 
commitment to Cairene’s government and international 
relief organizations; U.S provides minimal but adequate 
assistance to relief workers, enabling the effective 
distribution of aid; U.S. fulfils obligations to assist the 
people of Cairene; U.S. safeguards national and regional 
interest by containing rising instability within the city 
  Step 1.4 Identify the Potential Effects of Interventions 
considers the effects of each intervention action and determines 
that Western military presence should be kept as minimal and as 
discrete as possible. Higher-level political discussions with the 
Opposition Party and Ruling Party should remain within 
Department of State channels, while continued dialogue between 
local security officials and criminal leaders should continue. Joint 
U.S. and local HUMINT efforts should focus upon identifying 
Cairene sources of support of the regional terrorist organization. 
Further identification will allow lethal and non-lethal targeting by 
host nation and coalition forces. 
Step 2 – Decide and Assign Forces 
Cairene Case Example: Second Iteration – Step 2 
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 The J3 develops and prioritizes criteria to evaluate intervention 
alternatives, and defines the following criteria for decision making: 
• Risk to Own Troops: Conducting operations safely and 
without causing an international incident is of utmost 
concern for all deployments, particularly in peacetime. 
Planners should consider the potential loss of men, 
weapons, or equipment. 
• Regional Stability: Cairene influences regional and 
therefore worldwide stability. Containing the effects of 
destruction and facilitating a rapid economic recovery may 
reduce regional turmoil. Rapid actions to prevent civil 
discontent and meet essential needs will help to stabilize 
Cairene. 
• Ability to Build Capacity: Cairenean capacity to self-
recover by capitalizing on its resiliencies will speed the 
delivery of aid, while containing destruction in future 
disasters. Cairene’s capacity to provide services to the 
people has been degraded because of the earthquake. 
Military forces that can help to rebuild local capacity will 
help stabilize long term conditions in Cairene.  
• Disrupt Terrorist Activities: U.S. and host nation security 
forces should disrupt, destroy, or neutralize the regional 
terrorist organization without implicating Western military 
forces or escalating conflicts. Security forces should disrupt 
the possible alliance of local criminal organizations with 
the regional terrorist organization. 
• Moral Obligation: The United States has the means and the 
expertise to intervene, failing to do so will result in the 
unnecessary loss of life. Bilateral and multi-lateral 
international agreements require some kind of U.S. 
response to Cairene. An insufficient response to the disaster 
could harm U.S. relations abroad. 
• Intervention Conflict: Being drawn into a conflict; criminal 
elements and their potential connection to terrorist rhetoric 
and networks pose the risk of drawing the U.S. forces on 
the ground into a conflict. The visible presence of U.S. 
forces in Cairene could lead to conflict within Caireen. 
• Obligation versus Cost: Long-term commitment; Once 
committed to intervention, Cairene may expect the U.S. to 
provide long-term assistance which can incur a high 
operational costs. Planners should consider which 
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intervention forces can operate with reduced costs without 
incurring long-term obligations. 
• Capacity of Flow: Amount of aid that can be brought to 
Cairene; reduced throughput capacity of life sustaining 
commodities such as food, water, and medical aid will 
cause further human suffering. Additionally, effective 
stabilization and recovery necessitates transportation 
network repair since it is an integral part resources of all 
type.  
 The planner uses judgment to weight criteria and conducts a 
pairwise comparison with an excel AHP decision tool.175 Table 11 
below shows how each criterion is ranked against every other 
criterion: 
Table 11.   Second Iteration Criteria Pairwise Comparison 
 
 
• Note that the intensity is rated on a scale of 1 to 9 with 1 
being the lowest relative importance and 9 being the 
highest importance. 
• Table 12 below depicts the eigenvector values and ranking 
of criteria after the pairwise comparison has been 
completed: 
                                                
175.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
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Table 12.   Second Iteration Criteria, Eigenvector Values, and Ranking 
Criterion Eigenvector Value Ranking 
Risk to Own Troops 0.42 1 
Regional Stability 0.19 2 
Ability to Build Capacity 0.12 3 
Disrupt Terrorist Activities 0.09 4 
Moral Obligation 0.07 5 
Intervention Conflict 0.04 6 
Obligation versus Cost 0.04 7 
Capacity of Flow 0.04 8 
 
• The planner weights intervention alternatives against each 
of the weighted criteria individually, and then conducts a 
second pairwise comparison:176 
• Action 1 – U.S. SOF advises and assists the Cairene 
security forces to establish an increased presence within the 
slums to extend the rule of law. 
• Action 2 – U.S. SOF brokers negotiation talks between 
criminal elements’ leadership and the police and 
Opposition Party leadership to integrate slum dwellers into 
security and governance roles within the slums. 
• Action 3 – U.S. SOF and Cairenean security forces conduct 
direct action operations to degrade the regional terrorist 
organization. 
• Action 4 – U.S. forces only secure aid distribution networks 
used by the international community relief workers. All 
other security matters are relegated to Cairenean security 
forces. 
 The planner identifies the prioritized ranking of alternatives against 
each of the eight criterion. For example, Table 13 below shows 
how each of the intervention types is considered against the 
regional stability criterion: 
                                                
176.  Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making &,” 1-10. 
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Table 13.   Second Iteration Intervention Actions Pairwise Comparison Against 
Criterion – Regional Stability 
 
• The planner conducts this comparison for each of the 
remaining seven criteria. 
 Upon completing the pairwise comparisons, the planner determines 
the eigenvector values for each of the intervention actions against 
all eight criteria, as seen in Table 14 below: 
Table 14.   Second Iteration Intervention Actions, Eigenvector Values, and 
Ranking 
Alternatives – Intervention Actions Eigenvector Value Ranking 
Action 1: 
U.S. SOF advises and assists the Cairene security forces to 




U.S. SOF brokers negotiation talks between criminal elements’ 
leadership and the police and Opposition Party leadership to 




U.S. SOF and Cairenean security forces conduct direct action 
operations to degrade the regional terrorist organization. 
0.16 3 
Action 4: 
U.S. forces only secure aid distribution networks used by the 
international community relief workers. All other security matters 
are relegated to Cairenean security forces. 
0.12 4 
 
• The planner runs a sensitivity analysis below, in Figure 4, 
to better understand the robustness of the intervention 
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actions against each of the criteria and to identify if there is 
a point at which changes in criteria values yield a different 
recommended result: 
 
Figure 4.  Second Iteration AHP Sensitivity Analysis177 
• The 0.05 sensitivity analysis shows that Action 1 and 
Action 2 are the best suited actions if criteria change, while 
Action 3 and Action 4 are more susceptible to rapid changes 
in Cairene. 
                                                
177.  William P. Fox, “Multi-Attribute Decision Making & Mathematical Modeling for Decision 
Making, AHP and TOPSIS, DA 4410” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 
2015), 1-10; Saaty, T., “An exposition of the AHP in reply to the paper Remarks on the analytical hierarchy 
process by JS Dyer,” Management Science, 36, no. 3, 1990: 259–268. 
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As SOF continue operations in Step 3 Intervene, each action is informed by the 
planning process to include with whom to act or not act, what action to take or not take, 
when to act or not act, and where to act or not act. As a result, rapid decision making, a 
function of Step 2 Decide and Assign Forces, allows forces to counter widespread 
criminal activities, politically backed killings, and terrorist support actions. SOF further 
determines that continued low-level looting provides sufficient pre-occupation and 
income to criminal organizations, therefore giving criminal elements less incentive to 
partner with the terrorist organization. As the dialogue between the criminal elements and 
municipal government continues, several indigenous criminal leaders express interest in 
cooperating with the government while most immigrant criminal leaders refuse any 
communication. 
Upon evaluating intervention actions in Step 4 Evaluate, the J3 decides to foster 
ongoing SOF-sponsored reintegration dialogues between select criminal elements and 
Cairene police. Regional state partners offer to provide a military response to the terrorist 
activity in Cairene. The collaborative approach will reduce Western military presence, 
but the TSOC will facilitate intelligence sharing between regional partners. The 
Department of State works with government officials to broker a deal to bring no charges 
against the Opposition Party if politically motivated killings stop. 
The J3 determines that the intervention actions have opened the flow of aid to 
Cairene and assisted local security forces in maintaining security and rule of law in 
Cairene. The TSOC provided leadership, planning, and resource assistance to the 
government to address human suffering and security concerns. The TSOC also 
determines that a small advise and assist SOF presence is sufficient to maintain enduring 
support to Cairene’s civil administration. 
UIM Parallel Planning Considerations 
The application of the UIM to a highly specific case, like Cairene, demonstrates 
how each step in the model progresses. It does not highlight the parallel planning that 
occurs among other staff sections (J2, J3, J4, et cetera). In practice, however, every staff 
section would generate staff planning estimates using the UIM according to its roles, 
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mission, or perspectives. For these reasons, Figure 5 depicts how to plug in n number of 
models, horizontally and vertically. It demonstrates how parallel planning estimates 
(conceptualizations) address where, when, how, and why the flow of aid moves from 
input locations, through networks, to destinations (processes or actions). Each horizontal 
planning estimate should be constantly evaluated against the mission and the desired end 
state through feedback mechanisms. The change in the center of gravity (COG) from the 
first iteration to subsequent iterations can highlight how parallel planning from all staff 
sections contribute to the overall understanding and operation in subsequent time periods. 
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows how to incorporate other key problems like communications 
or economics that planners do not assess as COGs. The UIM allows a holistic approach 
and systematically tackles the complex environment of a megacity. It also connects 




Figure 5.  Urban Intervention Model – Interconnected Factors and Relationships 
Each step of the model builds upon the next step. By expanding acceptable 
intervention types, using concepts of who, where, what, and when, the model rapidly 
brings many factors together without considering each factor individually or their 
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relationships to other factors. Expanding acceptable intervention actions allows the rapid 
and passive consideration of the associated factors which is based on information gained 
in previous steps. Active consideration in subsequent steps also allows the planner to 
return to any previous step and make adjustments. The feedback mechanism facilitates 
flexible planning in environments when dynamics change rapidly, such as in megacities. 
This then allows the consideration of possible effects of interventions against the host of 
factors accounted for in all previous steps. If a planner moves backwards in any step to 
make adjustments or corrections, then the planner must continue in sequential order to 
account for changed variables in previous steps. A key benefit of the UIM is its simplicity 
and speed of application that enables both military and civilians to understand and apply 
the model. All of these qualities enhance military interventions that closely cooperate 
with the interagency and host nation planners. There is not a prescribed “right” or 
“wrong” manner to answer the questions; instead, it is creativity and open-mindedness 
that creates resilient responses in megacities. 
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